Related papers: Single-Call Mechanisms
In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the…
When a company undergoes a merger or transfers its ownership, the existing governing body has an opinion on which buyer should take over as the new owner. Similar situations occur while assigning the host of big sports tournaments, like the…
Using mechanised reasoning we prove that combinatorial Vickrey auctions are soundly specified in that they associate a unique outcome (allocation and transfers) to any valid input (bids). Having done so, we auto-generate verified executable…
We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is a special case of the well-studied unrelated machines…
The invariance thesis of Slot and van Emde Boas states that all reasonable models of computation simulate each other with polynomially bounded overhead in time and constant-factor overhead in space. In this paper we show that a family of…
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social network, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the buyers through the buyers' network. In single-item auctions, we show that no mechanism is…
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…
We study auction design in the celebrated interdependence model introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982], where a mechanism designer allocates a good, maximizing the value of the agent who receives it, while inducing truthfulness using…
We study a single-buyer pricing problem with unreliable side information, motivated by the increasing use of AI-assisted decision-making and LLM-based predictions. The seller observes a private sample that may be either accurate (coinciding…
Consider a trade market with one seller and multiple buyers. The seller aims to sell an indivisible item and maximize their revenue. This paper focuses on a simple and popular mechanism--the fixed-price mechanism. Unlike the standard…
A seller wants to sell a good to a set of bidders using a credible mechanism. We show that when the seller has private information about her cost, it is impossible for a static mechanism to achieve the optimal revenue. In particular, even…
Task allocation is a crucial process in modern systems, but it is often challenged by incomplete information about the utilities of participating agents. In this paper, we propose a new profit maximization mechanism for the task allocation…
We study truthful mechanisms for hiring a team of agents in three classes of set systems: Vertex Cover auctions, k-flow auctions, and cut auctions. For Vertex Cover auctions, the vertices are owned by selfish and rational agents, and the…
We study a Bayesian contract design problem in which a principal interacts with an unknown agent. We consider the single-parameter uncertainty model introduced by Alon et al. [2021], in which the agent's type is described by a single…
Peer prediction mechanisms incentivize agents to truthfully report their signals even in the absence of verification by comparing agents' reports with those of their peers. In the detail-free multi-task setting, agents respond to multiple…
A seminal theorem of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) proves that, in a game of bilateral trade between a single buyer and a single seller, no mechanism can be simultaneously individually-rational, budget-balanced, incentive-compatible and…
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is…
Peer-prediction is a mechanism which elicits privately-held, non-variable information from self-interested agents---formally, truth-telling is a strict Bayes Nash equilibrium of the mechanism. The original Peer-prediction mechanism suffers…
We consider the scheduling problem on $n$ strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias, Theory Comput. Syst. (2014)] where a machine…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…