Related papers: The Surprise Examination Paradox and the Second In…
We present a resolution of the celebrated "Surprise Exam Paradox". We argue that if the surprise exam story is analyzed using the exact same meaning of the notion of "surprise" as is dictated by the story itself, then no paradox arises.
Consider the following story: A teacher announces to her students a test for the following week, such that the test will be ``surprising''. The students use this as the basis for a ``logical derivation'' and reach a contradiction, which…
This paper gives a counterexample to the impossibility, by G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem, of proving a formula expressing the consistency of arithmetic in a fragment of arithmetic on the assumption that the latter is consistent.…
A detailed and rigorous analysis of G\"odel's proof of his first incompleteness theorem is presented. The purpose of this analysis is two-fold. The first is to reveal what G\"odel actually proved to provide a clear and solid foundation upon…
G\"odel's argument for the First Incompleteness Theorem is, structurally, a proof by contradiction. This article intends to reframe the argument by, first, isolating an additional assumption the argument relies on, and then, second, arguing…
I present the proof of Goedel's First Incompleteness theorem in an intuitive manner, while covering all technically challenging steps. I present generalizations of Goedel's fixed point lemma to two-sentence and multi-sentence versions,…
We argue that Godel's completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of consistent theories, and Godel's incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some…
G\"odel's first and second incompleteness theorems are corner stones of modern mathematics. In this article we present a new proof of these theorems for ZFC and theories containing ZFC, using Chaitin's incompleteness theorem and a very…
We give a reframing of Godel's first and second incompleteness theorems that applies even to some undefinable theories of arithmetic. The usual Hilbert-Bernays provability conditions and the diagonal lemma are replaced by a more direct…
It is argued that Goedel's incompleteness theorem should be seen as self-evident, rather than unexpected or surprising.
The fact that the famous Godel incompleteness theorem and the archetype of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar, are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but is a part of the common knowledge of logician community.…
We present a version of G\"odel's Second Incompleteness Theorem for recursively enumerable consistent extensions of a fixed axiomatizable theory, by incorporating some bi-theoretic version of the derivability conditions. We also argue that…
Transcript of G.J. Chaitin's 2 March 2000 Carnegie Mellon University School of Computer Science Distinguished Lecture. The notion of randomness is taken from physics and applied to pure mathematics in order to shed light on the…
This paper continues the author's previous study \cite{Kura20}, showing that several weak principles inspired by non-normal modal logic suffice to derive various refined forms of the second incompleteness theorem. Among the main results of…
G\"odel's second incompleteness theorem is standardly understood as showing that no sufficiently strong, consistent theory of arithmetic can prove its own consistency, a result typically interpreted against a model-theoretic background in…
The inconsistencies involved in the foundation of set theory were invariably caused by infinity and self-reference; and only with the opportune axiomatic restrictions could them be obviated. Throughout history, both concepts have proved to…
This proof of Godel's first incompleteness theorem doesn't require omega-consistency, nor does it refer to codes of negated sentences as in Rosser's. It begins from where Godel's usual proof ends, and stalks it till it ends proving it.
In this paper we briefly review and analyze three published proofs of Chaitin's theorem, the celebrated information-theoretic version of G\"odel's incompleteness theorem. Then, we discuss our main perplexity concerning a key step common to…
In much discussed work Artemov has recently shown that, for $\mathrm{PA}$, the consistency schema admits a form of uniform verification via selector proofs, despite the unprovability of the corresponding uniform consistency sentence…
An ultimate universal theory -- a complete theory that accounts, via few and simple first principles, for all the phenomena already observed and that will ever be observed -- has been, and still is, the aspiration of most physicists and…