Related papers: Notes on two elementary evolutionary games
In the original Evolutionary Minority Game, a segregation into two populations with opposing preferences is observed under many circumstances. We show that this segregation becomes more pronounced and more robust if the dynamics are changed…
The evolutionary dynamics of the Public Goods game addresses the emergence of cooperation within groups of individuals. However, the Public Goods game on large populations of interconnected individuals has been usually modeled without any…
The main topic of this thesis is the analysis of evolution equations reflecting issues in ecology and population dynamics. In mathematical modelling, the impact of environmental elements and the interaction between species is read into the…
These lectures contain a brief description of evolutionary models inspired by the statistical mechanics of disordered systems. After an introduction describing the Darwinian paradigm of evolving populations, the deterministic quasispecies…
Evolutionary game dynamics of two players with two strategies has been studied in great detail. These games have been used to model many biologically relevant scenarios, ranging from social dilemmas in mammals to microbial diversity. Some…
Population structure induced by both spatial embedding and more general networks of interaction, such as model social networks, have been shown to have a fundamental effect on the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary games. These effects…
This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2-strategy games. We…
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a…
This paper has a twofold scope. The first one is to clarify and put in evidence the isomorphic character of two theories developed in quite different fields: on one side, threshold logic, on the other side, simple games. One of the main…
We examine kinetic symmetry breaking phenomena in an evolutionary political game in which voters, inhabiting a multidimensional ideological space, cast ballots via selection mechanisms subject to the competing forces of conformity and…
Generalizing the cyclically competing three-species model (often referred to as the rock-paper-scissors game), we consider a simple system of population dynamics without spatial structures that involves four species. Unlike the previous…
Recent developments of eco-evolutionary models have shown that evolving feedbacks between behavioral strategies and the environment of game interactions, leading to changes in the underlying payoff matrix, can impact the underlying…
The game dynamical equations are derived from Boltzmann-like equations for individual pair interactions by assuming a certain kind of imitation behavior, the so-called proportional imitation rule. They can be extended to a stochastic…
In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game put forward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflict interactions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (or principal) on the…
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…
Evolutionary game theory has impacted many fields of research by providing a mathematical framework for studying the evolution and maintenance of social and moral behaviors. This success is owed in large part to the demonstration that the…
We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
We extend the concept of a classical two-person static game to the quantum domain, by giving an Hilbert structure to the space of classical strategies and studying the Battle of the Sexes game. We show that the introduction of entangled…