Related papers: After-gate attack on a quantum cryptosystem
By employing real-time monitoring of single-photon avalanche photodiodes we demonstrate how two types of practical eavesdropping strategies, the after-gate and time-shift attacks, may be detected. Both attacks are identified with the…
The information theoretic security promised by quantum key distribution (QKD) holds as long as the assumptions in the theoretical model match the parameters in the physical implementation. The superlinear behaviour of sensitive…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the…
Attacks that control single-photon detectors in quantum key distribution using tailored bright illumination are capable of eavesdropping the secret key. Here we report an automated testbench that checks the detector's vulnerabilities…
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully…
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In a simple experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending…
We propose and experimentally demonstrate a scheme to render the detection apparatus of a Quantum Key Distribution system immune to the main classes of hacking attacks in which the eavesdropper explores the back-door opened by the…
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can easily be obscured if the eavesdropper can utilize technical imperfections of the actual implementation. Here we describe and experimentally demonstrate a very simple but highly effective…
We experimentally demonstrate that a single-photon detector ID210 commercially available from ID Quantique is vulnerable to blinding and can be fully controlled by bright illumination. In quantum key distribution, this vulnerability can be…
Afterpulsing is a factor limiting the distance over which discrete-variable quantum key distribution systems are secure, and a common feature in single-photon detectors. The relevance of this phenomenon stems from its stochastic,…
Modern single-photon detectors based on avalanche photodiodes offer increasingly higher triggering speeds, thus fostering their use in several fields, prominently in the recent area of Quantum Key Distribution. To reduce the probability of…
We suggest a type of attack on quantum cryptosystems that exploits variations in detector efficiency as a function of a control parameter accessible to an eavesdropper. With gated single-photon detectors, this control parameter can be the…
InGaAs single-photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are key enablers for high-bit rate quantum key distribution. However, the deviation of such detectors from ideal models can open side-channels for an eavesdropper, Eve, to exploit. The…
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the…
In practical quantum key distribution systems, imperfect physical devices open security loopholes that challenge the core promise of this technology. Apart from various side channels, a vulnerability of single-photon detectors to blinding…
Avalanche photodiode based single photon detectors, as crucial and practical components, are widely used in quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. For effective detection, most of these SPDs are operated in the gated mode, in which the…
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks…
We introduce the concept of a superlinear threshold detector, a detector that has a higher probability to detect multiple photons if it receives them simultaneously rather than at separate times. Highly superlinear threshold detectors in…
We investigate the use of photon number states to identify eavesdropping attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes. The technique is based on the fact that different photon numbers traverse a channel with different transmittivity.…