Related papers: Sequential Rationality in Cryptographic Protocols
Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by…
Since the negative result of Lo (Physical Review A, 1997), it has been left open whether there exist some functions that can be securely computed in two-party setting in quantum domain when one of the parties is malicious. In this paper, we…
Blockchain systems benefit from lessons in prior art such as fault tolerance, distributed systems, peer-to-peer systems, and game theory. In this paper we argue that blockchain algorithms should tolerate both rational (self-interested)…
Semi-quantum protocols that allow some of the users to remain classical are proposed for a large class of problems associated with secure communication and secure multiparty computation. Specifically, first time semi-quantum protocols are…
In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…
Computational tractability and social welfare (aka. efficiency) of equilibria are two fundamental but in general orthogonal considerations in algorithmic game theory. Nevertheless, we show that when (approximate) full efficiency can be…
Equilibria of realistic multiplayer games constitute a key solution concept both in practical applications, such as online advertising auctions and electricity markets, and in analytical frameworks used to study strategic voting in…
Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…
This paper investigates a distributed robust Nash Equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for second-order players subject to external disturbances and uncertain dynamics while communicating via semi-Markov switching topologies. To accommodate the…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…
The rates of quantum cryptographic protocols are usually expressed in terms of a conditional entropy minimized over a certain set of quantum states. In particular, in the device-independent setting, the minimization is over all the quantum…
Secure computation often benefits from the use of correlated randomness to achieve fast, non-cryptographic online protocols. A recent paradigm put forth by Boyle $\textit{et al.}$ (CCS 2018, Crypto 2019) showed how pseudorandom correlation…
Worst-case hardness results for most equilibrium computation problems have raised the need for beyond-worst-case analysis. To this end, we study the smoothed complexity of finding pure Nash equilibria in Network Coordination Games, a…
Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…
Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the canonical solution concept of game theory, which provides an elegant tool to understand the rationalities. Though mixed strategy NE exists in any game with finite players and actions, computing NE in two- or…
We study in this paper privacy protection in fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking where a player can only access its own cost function and receive information from its immediate neighbors over a directed communication network. In view…
We present Colordag, a blockchain protocol where following the prescribed strategy is, with high probability, a best response as long as all miners have less than 1/2 of the mining power. We prove the correctness of Colordag even if there…
Nash equilibrium is a fundamental solution concept in extensive-form games, while its efficient computation is still far from straightforward. This paper considers finite $n$-player extensive-form games with perfect recall under the…
Noncooperative games with uncertain payoffs have been classically studied under the expected-utility theory framework, which relies on the strong assumption that agents behave rationally. However, simple experiments on human decision makers…
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the…