Related papers: Sequential Rationality in Cryptographic Protocols

Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…

This paper studies the global Nash equilibrium problem of leader-follower multi-agent dynamics, which yields consensus with a privacy information encrypted learning algorithm. With the secure hierarchical structure, the relationship between…

This paper develops a framework to extend the strategic form analysis of cursed equilibrium (CE) developed by Eyster and Rabin (2005) to multi-stage games. The approach uses behavioral strategies rather than normal form mixed strategies,…

This paper investigates a resilient distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem on a directed communication network subject to malicious cyber-attacks. The considered attacks, named as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, are allowed to…

This paper explores distributed Nash equilibrium seeking problems for games in which the players have limited knowledge on other players' actions. In particular, the involved players are considered to be high-order integrators with their…

Our computers today, from sophisticated servers to small smartphones, operate based on the same computing model, which requires running a sequence of discrete instructions, specified as an algorithm. This sequential computing paradigm has…

We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…

Modern applications often operate on data in multiple administrative domains. In this federated setting, participants may not fully trust each other. These distributed applications use transactions as a core mechanism for ensuring…

We propose a stochastic first-order algorithm to learn the rationality parameters of simultaneous and non-cooperative potential games, i.e., the parameters of the agents' optimization problems. Our technique combines (i.) an active-set step…

The problem of unconditional security of quantum cryptography (i.e. the security which is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of nature rather than by technical limitations) is one of the central points in quantum information theory. We…

Privacy preservation has served as a key metric in designing Nash equilibrium (NE) computation algorithms. Although differential privacy (DP) has been widely employed for privacy guarantees, it does not exploit prior distributional…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

We introduce Cryptis, an extension of the Iris separation logic that can be used to verify cryptographic components using the symbolic model of cryptography. The combination of separation logic and cryptographic reasoning allows us to prove…

Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

Recent extensions to dynamic games of the well-known fictitious play learning procedure in static games were proved to globally converge to stationary Nash equilibria in two important classes of dynamic games (zero-sum and…

The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…

We present a simple primal-dual algorithm for computing approximate Nash-equilibria in two-person zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information and perfect recall (like Texas Hold'em Poker). Our algorithm is numerically stable,…

This paper investigates closed-loop Nash equilibria for discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) stochastic nonzero-sum difference games with random coefficients. Unlike existing works, we consider randomness in both state dynamics and cost…