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Recent years have seen increased interest in the design and deployment of smart grid devices and control algorithms. Each of these smart communicating devices represents a potential access point for an intruder spurring research into…
We consider optimal intervention in the Elliott-Golub-Jackson network model \cite{jackson14} and we show that it can be transformed into an influence maximization-like form, interpreted as the reverse of a default cascade. Our analysis of…
The paper studies the routing in the network shared by several users. Each user seeks to optimize either its own performance or some combination between its own performance and that of other users, by controlling the routing of its given…
Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…
We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
Demand-side management (DSM) enables distribution system operators (DSOs) to steer electricity consumption through dynamic price signals or incentive mechanisms, thereby leveraging end-users' flexibility potential for delivering grid…
Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to design information structures to ameliorate the overall experience…
We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics,…
The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and across groups they…
The pursuit of sustainability motivates microgrids that depend on distributed resources to produce more renewable energies. An efficient operation and planning relies on a holistic framework that takes into account the interdependent…
This paper characterizes optimal classification when individuals adjust their behavior in response to the classification rule. We model the interaction between a designer and a population as a Stackelberg game: the designer selects a…
The objective of this paper is to identify and analyze the response actions of a set of players embedded in sub-networks in the context of interaction and learning. We characterize strategic network formation as a static game of…
Modern random access mechanisms combine packet repetitions with multi-user detection mechanisms at the receiver to maximize the throughput and reliability in massive Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. However, optimizing the access policy,…
Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the…
Estimating the effects of interventions in networks is complicated when the units are interacting, such that the outcomes for one unit may depend on the treatment assignment and behavior of many or all other units (i.e., there is…
Distributed Opportunistic Scheduling (DOS) is inherently harder than conventional opportunistic scheduling due to the absence of a central entity that has knowledge of all the channel states. With DOS, stations contend for the channel using…
An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game…