Related papers: Intervention Mechanism Design for Networks With Se…
This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for the design and analysis of a new class of incentive schemes called intervention schemes. We formulate intervention games, propose a solution concept of intervention equilibrium, and prove…
We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this paper, we…
This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As opposed to the existing…
Network games study the strategic interaction of agents connected through a network. Interventions in such a game -- actions a coordinator or planner may take that change the utility of the agents and thus shift the equilibrium action…
This paper studies the problem of intervention design for steering the actions of noncooperative players in quadratic network games to the social optimum. The players choose their actions with the aim of maximizing their individual payoff…
In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
Targeted interventions in games present a challenging problem due to the asymmetric information available to the regulator and the agents. This note addresses the problem of steering the actions of self-interested agents in quadratic…
Incentives play an important role in (security and IT) risk management of a large-scale organization with multiple autonomous divisions. This paper presents an incentive mechanism design framework for risk management based on a…
Interactions among selfish users sharing a common transmission channel can be modeled as a non-cooperative game using the game theory framework. When selfish users choose their transmission probabilities independently without any…
In many wireless communication networks a common channel is shared by multiple users who must compete to gain access to it. The operation of the network by self-interested and strategic users usually leads to the overuse of the channel…
Network-based systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users and the overall system.…
We study the problem of designing dynamic intervention policies for minimizing networked defaults in financial networks. Formally, we consider a dynamic version of the celebrated Eisenberg-Noe model of financial network liabilities and use…
In economic settings such as learning, social behavior, and financial contagion, agents interact through interdependent networks. This paper examines how a decision maker (DM) can design an optimal intervention strategy under network…
We propose an incentive scheme based on intervention to sustain cooperation among self-interested users. In the proposed scheme, an intervention device collects imperfect signals about the actions of the users for a test period, and then…
In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…
We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…
There are many familiar situations in which a manager seeks to design a system in which users share a resource, but outcomes depend on the information held and actions taken by users. If communication is possible, the manager can ask users…
Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…
Consider a coordination game played on a network, where agents prefer taking actions closer to those of their neighbors and to their own ideal points in action space. We explore how the welfare outcomes of a coordination game depend on…