Related papers: Simultaneous Go via quantum collapse
We present the first study of a dynamical quantum game. Each agent has a `memory' of her performance over the previous m timesteps, and her strategy can evolve in time. The game exhibits distinct regimes of optimality. For small m the…
Stochastic games generalize Markov decision processes (MDPs) to a multiagent setting by allowing the state transitions to depend jointly on all player actions, and having rewards determined by multiplayer matrix games at each state. We…
The game of Go has a long history in East Asian countries, but the field of Computer Go has yet to catch up to humans until the past couple of years. While the rules of Go are simple, the strategy and combinatorics of the game are immensely…
This paper consider the possibility of using some quantum tools in decision making strategies. In particular, we consider here a dynamical open quantum system helping two players, $\G_1$ and $\G_2$, to take their decisions in a specific…
In this paper, we present a board game: Square War. The game definition of Square War is similar to the classic Chinese board game Go. Then we propose a mathematical problem of the game Square War. Finally, we show that the problem can be…
The well known refinement of the Nash Equilibrium (NE) called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) is investigated in the quantum Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game that is played using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type setting. Earlier results…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
We apply several quantization schemes to simple versions of the Chinos game. Classically, for two players with one coin each, there is a symmetric stable strategy that allows each player to win half of the times on average. A partial…
This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…
In the Colonel Blotto game, two players with a fixed budget simultaneously allocate their resources across n battlefields to maximize the aggregate value gained from the battlefields where they have the higher allocation. Despite its…
We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are "strategically equivalent" if, for every…
Games on graphs provide a natural model for reactive non-terminating systems. In such games, the interaction of two players on an arena results in an infinite path that describes a run of the system. Different settings are used to model…
In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…
A version of the Monty Hall problem is presented where the players are permitted to select quantum strategies. If the initial state involves no entanglement the Nash equilibrium in the quantum game offers the players nothing more than can…
We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…
We show that equilibria of a sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic game (SSNG) can be adopted by players in corresponding large but finite dynamic games to achieve near-equilibrium payoffs. Such equilibria in the form of random…
The concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), introduced by Smith and Price, is a refinement of Nash equilibrium in 2-player symmetric games in order to explain counter-intuitive natural phenomena, whose existence is not…
In this paper, I prove that existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in games with infinitely many players is equivalent to the axiom of choice.
Nash equilibrium is often heralded as a guiding principle for rational decision-making in strategic interactions. However, it is well-known that Nash equilibrium sometimes fails as a reliable predictor of outcomes, with two of the most…
We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen's result can be…