Related papers: Multimode Control Attacks on Elections
The introduction of multimodal models is a huge step forward in Artificial Intelligence. A single model is trained to understand multiple modalities: text, image, video, and audio. Open-source multimodal models have made these breakthroughs…
We survey the design of elections that are resilient to attempted interference by third parties. For example, suppose votes have been cast in an election between two candidates, and then each vote is randomly changed with a small…
Simulating hostile attacks of physical autonomous systems can be a useful tool to examine their robustness to attack and inform vulnerability-aware design. In this work, we examine this through the lens of multi-robot patrol, by presenting…
Scoring protocols are a broad class of voting systems. Each is defined by a vector $(\alpha_1,\alpha_2,...,\alpha_m)$, $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2 \geq >... \geq \alpha_m$, of integers such that each voter contributes $\alpha_1$ points to…
In many real world situations, collective decisions are made using voting and, in scenarios such as committee or board elections, employing voting rules that return multiple winners. In multi-winner approval voting (AV), an agent submits a…
It is important to understand how the outcome of an election can be modified by an agent with control over the structure of the election. Electoral control has been studied for many election systems, but for all studied systems the winner…
People who are involved with political campaigns face increased digital security threats from well-funded, sophisticated attackers, especially nation-states. Improving political campaign security is a vital part of protecting democracy. To…
We consider a two-round election model involving $m$ voters and $n$ candidates. Each voter is endowed with a strict preference list ranking the candidates. In the first round, the candidates are partitioned into two subsets, $A$ and $B$,…
Electoral control types are ways of trying to change the outcome of elections by altering aspects of their composition and structure [BTT92]. We say two compatible (i.e., having the same input types) control types that are about the same…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…
In this paper, we consider that, in practice, attack scenarios involving side-channel analysis combine two successive phases:an analysis phase, targeting the extraction of information about the target and the identification of possible…
How often will elections end in landslides? What is the probability for a head-to-head race? Analyzing ballot results from several large countries rather anomalous and yet unexplained distributions have been observed. We identify tactical…
Most of the computational study of election problems has assumed that each voter's preferences are, or should be extended to, a total order. However in practice voters may have preferences with ties. We study the complexity of manipulative…
The election of a leader in a network is a challenging task, especially when the processes are asynchronous, i.e., execute an algorithm with time-varying periods. Thales developed an industrial election algorithm with an arbitrary number of…
In this work, we demonstrate universal multi-party poisoning attacks that adapt and apply to any multi-party learning process with arbitrary interaction pattern between the parties. More generally, we introduce and study $(k,p)$-poisoning…
An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games…
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where…
We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote…
We study the computational complexity of controlling the result of an election by breaking ties strategically. This problem is equivalent to the problem of deciding the winner of an election under parallel universes tie-breaking. When the…
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…