Related papers: Attack--Defense Trees and Two-Player Binary Zero-S…

In strategy games, one of the most important aspects of game design is maintaining a sense of challenge for players. Many mobile titles feature quick gameplay loops that allow players to progress steadily, requiring an abundance of levels…

A core novelty of Alpha Zero is the interleaving of tree search and deep learning, which has proven very successful in board games like Chess, Shogi and Go. These games have a discrete action space. However, many real-world reinforcement…

We consider two-player zero-sum games on graphs. These games can be classified on the basis of the information of the players and on the mode of interaction between them. On the basis of information the classification is as follows: (a)…

We consider finite two-person normal form games. The following four properties of their game forms are equivalent: (i) Nash-solvability, (ii) zero-sum-solvability, (iii) win-lose-solvability, and (iv) tightness. For (ii, iii, iv) this was…

We focus on adversarial patrolling games on arbitrary graphs, where the Defender can control a mobile resource, the targets are alarmed by an alarm system, and the Attacker can observe the actions of the mobile resource of the Defender and…

Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…

Standard game theory assumes that the structure of the game is common knowledge among players. We relax this assumption by considering extensive games where agents may be unaware of the complete structure of the game. In particular, they…

Attack trees (ATs) are a widely deployed modelling technique to categorize potential attacks on a system. An attacker of such a system aims at doing as much damage as possible, but might be limited by a cost budget. The maximum possible…

We consider two-player turn-based games with zero-reachability and zero-safety objectives generated by extended vector addition systems with states. Although the problem of deciding the winner in such games is undecidable in general, we…

Adversarial training is a standard technique for training adversarially robust models. In this paper, we study adversarial training as an alternating best-response strategy in a 2-player zero-sum game. We prove that even in a simple…

Extensive games are tools largely used in economics to describe decision processes ofa community of agents. In this paper we propose a formal presentation based on theproof assistant COQ which focuses mostly on infinite extensive games and…

We consider average-energy games, where the goal is to minimize the long-run average of the accumulated energy. While several results have been obtained on these games recently, decidability of average-energy games with a lower-bound…

Abuse of zero-permission sensors on-board mobile and wearable devices to infer users' personal context and information is a well-known privacy threat that has received significant attention. Efforts towards protection mechanisms that…

The game theoretic concepts of rationalizability and iterated dominance are closely related and provide characterizations of each other. Indeed, the equivalence between them implies that in a two player finite game, the remaining set of…

In this paper, we consider a target defense game in which the attacker team seeks to reach a high-value target while the defender team seeks to prevent that by capturing them away from the target. To address the curse of dimensionality, a…

We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…

With the explosion in the availability of spatio-temporal tracking data in modern sports, there is an enormous opportunity to better analyse, learn and predict important events in adversarial group environments. In this paper, we propose a…

The success of a security attack crucially depends on time: the more time available to the attacker, the higher the probability of a successful attack. Formalisms such as Reliability block diagrams, Reliability graphs and Attack…

In this paper we characterise the long-run behaviour of the replicator dynamic in zero-sum games (symmetric or non-symmetric). Specifically, we prove that every zero-sum game possesses a unique global replicator attractor, which we then…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…