Related papers: Set-Monotonicity Implies Kelly-Strategyproofness
In a context where a decision has to be taken collectively by several agents, the social choice problem consists in deciding whether there exists a socially acceptable rule that aggregates the individual preferences of the agents into a…
Previous explanations for the persistence of polarization of opinions have typically included modelling assumptions that predispose the possibility of polarization (i.e., assumptions allowing a pair of agents to drift apart in their opinion…
We study committee voting rules under ranked preferences, which map the voters' preference relations to a subset of the alternatives of predefined size. In this setting, the compatibility between proportional representation and committee…
Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations arising in voting theory: regarding their permutations as preference orders on a list of candidates, one avoids Condorcet's paradox when aggregating the preferences via a simple majority…
The desirable gambles framework provides a foundational approach to imprecise probability theory but relies heavily on linear utility assumptions. This paper introduces function-coherent gambles, a generalization that accommodates…
The present paper investigates consequence relations that are both non-monotonic and paraconsistent. More precisely, we put the focus on preferential consequence relations, i.e. those relations that can be defined by a binary preference…
For multidimensional Euclidean type spaces, we study convex choice: from any choice set, the set of types that make the same choice is convex. We establish that, in a suitable sense, this property characterizes the sufficiency of local…
We study the interaction between strategy, heterogeneity and growth in a two-agent model of capital accumulation. Preferences are represented by recursive utility functions with decreasing marginal impatience. The stationary equilibria of…
A recent proposal for a superdeterministic account of quantum mechanics, named Invariant-set theory, appears to bring ideas from several diverse fields like chaos theory, number theory and dynamical systems to quantum foundations. However,…
When the information about uncertainty cannot be quantified in a simple, probabilistic way, the topic of possibilistic decision theory is often a natural one to consider. The development of possibilistic decision theory has lead to a series…
Much work on argument systems has focussed on preferred extensions which define the maximal collectively defensible subsets. Identification and enumeration of these subsets is (under the usual assumptions) computationally demanding. We…
Social Choice theory generalizes voting on one proposal to ranking multiple proposals. Yet, while a vote on a single proposal has the status quo (Reality) as a default, Reality has been forsaken during this generalization. Here, we propose…
Shortlisting of candidates--selecting a group of "best" candidates--is a special case of multiwinner elections. We provide the first in-depth study of the computational complexity of strategic voting for shortlisting based on the perhaps…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the…
We analyze the problem of locating a public facility on a line in a society where agents have either single-peaked or single-dipped preferences. We consider the domain analyzed in Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2024), where the type of preference of…
We study the properties of elections that have a given position matrix (in such elections each candidate is ranked on each position by a number of voters specified in the matrix). We show that counting elections that generate a given…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own…
In a seminal paper, Choquet introduced an integral formula to extend a monotone increasing setfunction on a sigma-algebra to a (nonlinear) functional on bounded measurable functions. The most important special case is when the setfunction…