Related papers: Set-Monotonicity Implies Kelly-Strategyproofness

Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof…

An important -- but very demanding -- property in collective decision-making is strategyproofness, which requires that voters cannot benefit from submitting insincere preferences. Gibbard (1977) has shown that only rather unattractive rules…

A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $\alpha$ (contraction) and…

We study the manipulability of social choice correspondences in situations where individuals have incomplete information about others' preferences. We propose a general concept of manipulability that depends on the extension rule used to…

In the problem of fully allocating a social endowment of perfectly divisible commodities among a group of agents with multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we study strategy-proof rules that are not Pareto-dominated by other…

Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the voters' preferences over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over these alternatives. In a seminal result, Gibbard (1977) has characterized the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with…

Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…

In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…

Two characterizations of the whole class of strategy-proof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal preorders in finite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such a class consists precisely of…

We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…

Gibbard and Satterthwaite have shown that the only single-valued social choice functions (SCFs) that satisfy non-imposition (i.e., the function's range coincides with its codomain) and strategyproofness (i.e., voters are never better off by…

We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…

One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather…

We provide novel simple representations of strategy-proof voting rules when voters have uni-dimensional single-peaked preferences (as well as multi-dimensional separable preferences). The analysis recovers, links and unifies existing…

We analyze the problem of locating a public facility in a domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences when the social planner knows the type of preference (single-peaked or single-dipped) of each agent. Our main result…

We analyze the relation between strategy-proofness and preference reversal in the case that agents may declare indifference. Interestingly, Berga and Moreno (2020), have recently derived preference reversal from group strategy-proofness of…

Several of the classical results in social choice theory demonstrate that in order for many voting systems to be well-behaved the set domain of individual preferences must satisfy some kind of restriction, such as being single-peaked on a…

An important characteristic of many logics for Artificial Intelligence is their nonmonotonicity. This means that adding a formula to the premises can invalidate some of the consequences. There may, however, exist formulae that can always be…

We study the effect of strategic behavior in iterative voting for multiple issues under uncertainty. We introduce a model synthesizing simultaneous multi-issue voting with Meir, Lev, and Rosenschein (2014)'s local dominance theory and…