Related papers: Stable schedule matchings by a fixed point method
We derive a system of fixed-point equations for the equilibrium transfers in a class of one-to-one matching models with linear transferable utility. We then show that, when the degree of substitution between alternatives is bounded from…
Fair classification has been a topic of intense study in machine learning, and several algorithms have been proposed towards this important task. However, in a recent study, Friedler et al. observed that fair classification algorithms may…
We present a class of iterative fully distributed fixed point methods to solve a system of linear equations, such that each agent in the network holds one of the equations of the system. Under a generic directed, strongly connected network,…
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
In this article we discuss a possibility to implement a well-known scheme of proof for contraction mapping theorems in a situation, when convergence, families of Cauchy sequences, and contractiveness of mappings are defined axiomatically.…
In this work we introduce a topological method for the search of fixed points and periodic points for continuous maps defined on generalized rectangles in finite dimensional Euclidean spaces. We name our technique "Stretching Along the…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
We introduce and study a new model that we call the {\em matching model}. Items arrive one by one in a buffer and depart from it as soon as possible but by pairs. The items of a departing pair are said to be {\em matched}. There is a finite…
Motivated by group-project distribution, we introduce and study stable matching under the constraint of applicants needing to share a location to be matched with the same institute, which we call the Location-Restricted Stable Matching…
We prove the existence and we study the stability of the kink-like fixed points in a simple Coupled Map Lattice for which the local dynamics has two stable fixed points. The condition for the existence allows us to define a critical value…
We prove a general finite convergence theorem for "upward-guarded" fixpoint expressions over a well-quasi-ordered set. This has immediate applications in regular model checking of well-structured systems, where a main issue is the eventual…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
We study a matching problem between agents and public goods, in settings without monetary transfers. Since goods are public, they have no capacity constraints. There is no exogenously defined budget of goods to be provided. Rather, each…
We present a fixed point theorem for a class of (potentially) non-monotonic functions over specially structured complete lattices. The theorem has as a special case the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem when restricted to the case of…
Fixed-time stable dynamical systems are capable of achieving exact convergence to an equilibrium point within a fixed time that is independent of the initial conditions of the system. This property makes them highly appealing for designing…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…