Related papers: Characterization of Feedback Nash Equilibrium for …
At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept developed in a previous paper (arXiv:1307.2035v4), in contrast, the own payoff…
Methods of exploring Nash equilibrium in quantum games are studied. Analytical conditions of the existence, the uniqueness or the multiplicity of the equilibria are found.
We analyze, using a dynamical systems approach, the replicator dynamics for the asymmetric Hawk-Dove game in which there is a set of four pure strategies with arbitrary payoffs. We give a full account of the equilibrium points and their…
Towards characterizing the optimization landscape of games, this paper analyzes the stability of gradient-based dynamics near fixed points of two-player continuous games. We introduce the quadratic numerical range as a method to…
Is there an algorithm that takes a game in normal form as input, and outputs a Nash equilibrium? If the payoffs are integers, the answer is yes, and lot of work has been done in its computational complexity. If the payoffs are permitted to…
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…
We use vector bundles to study the locus of totally mixed Nash equilibria of an $n$-player game in normal form, which we call the Nash equilibrium scheme. When the payoff tensor format is balanced, we study the Nash discriminant variety,…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
Game Theory has been frequently applied in biological research since 1970s. While the key idea of Game Theory is Nash Equilibrium, it is critical to understand and figure out the payoff matrix in order to calculate Nash Equilibrium. In this…
In an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most $\epsilon$ by unilaterally changing his behaviour. For two-player (bimatrix) games with payoffs in $[0,1]$, the best-known$\epsilon$ achievable in polynomial time is 0.3393. In…
In this paper, we address the inverse problem in the case of linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic non-cooperative games. Given feedback laws of players that are known to be a Nash equilibrium pair for a discrete-time linear system, we…
This paper focuses on a kind of linear quadratic non-zero sum differential game driven by backward stochastic differential equation with asymmetric information, which is a natural continuation of Wang and Yu [IEEE TAC (2010) 55: 1742-1747,…
We consider a general class of finite-player stochastic games with mean-field interaction, in which the linear-quadratic cost functional includes linear operators acting on controls in $L^2$. We propose a novel approach for deriving the…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the Nash…
Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…
In a society of multiple individuals, if everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, will there exist any equilibrium for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody…
We discuss similarities and differences between systems of interacting players maximizing their individual payoffs and particles minimizing their interaction energy. Long-run behavior of stochastic dynamics of spatial games with multiple…
For a non-cooperative m-persons differential game, the value functions ofthe various players satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.Nashequilibrium solutions in feedback form can be obtained by studying a related system of…