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Improving algorithms via predictions is a very active research topic in recent years. This paper initiates the systematic study of mechanism design in this model. In a number of well-studied mechanism design settings, we make use of…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
In this paper we prove Chaitin's ``heuristic principle'', {\it the theorems of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the theory itself}, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the measure is…
We present an adequacy theorem for a concurrent extension of probabilistic GCL. The underlying denotational semantics is based on the so-called mixed powerdomains, which combine non-determinism with probabilistic behaviour. The theorem…
A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to…
This study proposes a new efficiency requirement, a minimal almost weak Pareto principle, which says that x is socially better than y whenever the only one individual never prefers y to x, and all the others prefers x to y. Then, I show…
In this paper we study a discrete time consensus model on a connected graph with monotonically increasing peer-pressure and noise perturbed outputs masking a hidden state. We assume that each agent maintains a constant hidden state and a…
Many decision problems in economics, information technology, and industry can be transformed to an optimal stopping of adapted random vectors with some utility function over the set of Markov times with respect to filtration build by the…
We first provide some properties of the Mellin transform of nonnegative random variables, such that monotonicity, injectivity and effect of size biasing. Convergence of Mellin transforms is also entirely formalized through convergence in…
We consider the Maximum Vectors problem in a strategic setting. In the classical setting this problem consists, given a set of $k$-dimensional vectors, in computing the set of all nondominated vectors. Recall that a vector $v=(v^1, v^2,…
In this paper, we study the continuous-time consensus problem in the presence of adversaries. The networked multi-agent system is modeled as a switched system, where the normal agents have integrator dynamics and the switching signal…
In most social choice settings, the participating agents express their preferences over the different alternatives in the form of linear orderings. While this clearly simplifies preference elicitation, it inevitably leads to poor…
We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider…
Actual individual preferences are neither complete (=total) nor antisymmetric in general, so that at least every quasi-order must be an admissible input to a satisfactory choice rule. It is argued that the traditional notion of…
This paper proposes a new approach to analyze and synthesize robust consensus control laws for general linear leaderless multi-agent systems (MASs) subjected to input constraints or uncertainties. First, the MAS under input constraints or…
A universal feature of human societies is the adoption of systems of rules and norms in the service of cooperative ends. How can we build learning agents that do the same, so that they may flexibly cooperate with the human institutions they…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
Regulatory and contractual constraints on individual exposures are standard in insurance and reinsurance markets, but a poorly designed constraint can distort the economic incentives of risk-averse agents. In the unconstrained problem, the…
This paper presents novel theoretical results to guarantee multi-agent set invariance using Matrix Control Barrier Functions in sampled-data systems. More specifically, the paper presents conditions under which heterogeneous control-affine…
We develop a toolbox for forcing over arbitrary models of set theory without the axiom of choice. In particular, we introduce a variant of the countable chain condition and prove an iteration theorem that applies to many classical forcings…