Related papers: Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
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We propose a projected gradient dynamical system as a model for a bargaining scheme for an asset for which the two interested agents have personal valuations which do not initially coincide. The personal valuations are formed using…
In a framework close to the one developed by Holmstr\"om and Milgrom [44], we study the optimal contracting scheme between a Principal and several Agents. Each hired Agent is in charge of one project, and can make efforts towards managing…
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