Related papers: Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
This paper considers a class of strategic scenarios in which two networks of agents have opposing objectives with regards to the optimization of a common objective function. In the resulting zero-sum game, individual agents collaborate with…
In this paper, we consider game problems played by (multi)-integrator agents, subject to external disturbances. We propose Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics based on gradient-play, augmented with a dynamic internal-model based component,…
We introduce a strategic behavior in reinsurance bilateral transactions, where agents choose the risk preferences they will appear to have in the transaction. Within a wide class of risk measures, we identify agents' strategic choices to a…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
Modern socio-technical systems typically consist of many interconnected users and competing service providers, where notions like market equilibrium are tightly connected to the ``evolution'' of the network of users. In this paper, we model…
We present a fully-distributed algorithm for Nash equilibrium seeking in aggregative games over networks. The proposed scheme endows each agent with a gradient-based scheme equipped with a tracking mechanism to locally reconstruct the…
In this work, we consider a population composed of a continuum of agents that seek to maximize a payoff function by moving on a network. The nodes in the network may represent physical locations or abstract choices. The population is…
A social choice procedure is modeled as a repeated Nash game between the social agents, who are communicating with each other through a social communication network modeled by an undirected graph. The agents' criteria for this game are…
We introduce a new framework to model interactions among agents which seek to trade to minimize their risk with respect to some future outcome. We quantify this risk using the concept of risk measures from finance, and introduce a class of…
In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action…
Recent regulation on intraday electricity markets has led to the development of shared order books with the intention to foster competition and increase market liquidity. In this paper, we address the question of the efficiency of such…
This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
This article investigates the problem of dynamic spectrum access for canonical wireless networks, in which the channel states are time-varying. In the most existing work, the commonly used optimization objective is to maximize the…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
We study systems of interacting reinforced stochastic processes, where agents' decisions evolve under reinforcement, network-mediated interactions, and environmental influences. In competitive environments with irreducible networks, we…
We propose an adaptive incentive mechanism that learns the optimal incentives in environments where players continuously update their strategies. Our mechanism updates incentives based on each player's externality, defined as the difference…
We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…
We investigate a social system of agents faced with a binary choice. We assume there is a correct, or beneficial, outcome of this choice. Furthermore, we assume agents are influenced by others in making their decision, and that the agents…