Related papers: Evolutionary games in the multiverse

Coevolution of two species is typically thought to favour the evolution of faster evolutionary rates helping a species keep ahead in the Red Queen race, where `it takes all the running you can do to stay where you are'. In contrast, if…

Many mathematical frameworks of evolutionary game dynamics assume that the total population size is constant and that selection affects only the relative frequency of strategies. Here, we consider evolutionary game dynamics in an extended…

Iterated games are a fundamental component of economic and evolutionary game theory. They describe situations where two players interact repeatedly and have the possibility to use conditional strategies that depend on the outcome of…

In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…

We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…

We study effects of strategy-dependent time delays on equilibria of evolving populations. It is well known that time delays may cause oscillations in dynamical systems. Here we report a novel behavior. We show that microscopic models of…

Here we introduce a model in which individuals differ in the rate at which they seek new interactions with others, making rational decisions modeled as general symmetric two-player games. Once a link between two individuals has formed, the…

We consider a broad class of stochastic imitation dynamics over networks, encompassing several well known learning models such as the replicator dynamics. In the considered models, players have no global information about the game…

We propose an evolutionary coordination game to formalize a simplified model of the evolution of strategies during human courtship. The dynamics, derived from the consideration of experimental observations on human social behavior driven by…

This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…

People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…

Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary-ecological, and even psychological-economic systems. Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like tragedy of the…

The behaviour of multi-agent learning in many player games has been shown to display complex dynamics outside of restrictive examples such as network zero-sum games. In addition, it has been shown that convergent behaviour is less likely to…

In the animal world, the competition between individuals belonging to different species for a resource often requires the cooperation of several individuals in groups. This paper proposes a generalization of the Hawk-Dove Game for an…

We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one…

Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…

The "War of Attrition" is a classical game theoretic model that was first introduced to mathematically describe certain non-violent animal behavior. The original setup considers two participating players in a one-shot game competing for a…

Direct reciprocity facilitates the evolution of cooperation when individuals interact repeatedly. Most previous studies on direct reciprocity implicitly assume compulsory interactions. Yet, interactions are often voluntary in human…

People make strategic decisions many times a day - during negotiations, when coordinating actions with others, or when choosing partners for cooperation. The resulting dynamics can be studied with learning theory and evolutionary game…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…