Related papers: Truthful Fair Division
A fundamental result in cake cutting states that for any number of players with arbitrary preferences over a cake, there exists a division of the cake such that every player receives a single contiguous piece and no player is left envious.…
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated…
Single minded agents have strict preferences, in which a bundle is acceptable only if it meets a certain demand. Such preferences arise naturally in scenarios such as allocating computational resources among users, where the goal is to…
We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show…
Cutting a cake is a metaphor for the problem of dividing a resource (cake) among several agents. The problem becomes non-trivial when the agents have different valuations for different parts of the cake (i.e. one agent may like chocolate…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
In this note we study a problem of fair division in the absence of full information. We give an algorithm which solves the following problem: n $\ge$ 2 persons want to cut a cake into n shares so that each person will get at least 1/n of…
The problem of fair division known as "cake cutting" has been the focus of multiple papers spanning several decades. The most prominent problem in this line of work has been to bound the query complexity of computing an envy-free outcome in…
Given a set of $p$ players we consider problems concerning envy-free allocation of collections of $k$ pieces from a given set of goods or chores. We show that if $p\le n$ and each player can choose $k$ pieces out of $n$ pieces of a cake,…
We consider a setting in which a single divisible good ("cake") needs to be divided between n players, each with a possibly different valuation function over pieces of the cake. For this setting, we address the problem of finding divisions…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
Cake-cutting is a fundamental model of dividing a heterogeneous resource, such as land, broadcast time, and advertisement space. In this study, we consider the problem of dividing a discrete cake fairly in which the indivisible goods are…
Classic cake-cutting algorithms enable people with different preferences to divide among them a heterogeneous resource (``cake''), such that the resulting division is fair according to each agent's individual preferences. However, these…
We study the paradigmatic fair division problem of allocating a divisible good among agents with heterogeneous preferences, commonly known as cake cutting. Classical cake cutting protocols are susceptible to manipulation. Do their strategic…
A perfectly divisible cake is to be divided among a group of agents. Each agent is entitled to a share between zero and one, and these entitlements are compatible in that they sum to one. The mediator does not know the preferences of the…
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This…
We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families. Each family is given a piece of the resource and this piece is used simultaneously by all…
We study the fair allocation of a cake, which serves as a metaphor for a divisible resource, under the requirement that each agent should receive a contiguous piece of the cake. While it is known that no finite envy-free algorithm exists in…
We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…
The classic cake-cutting problem provides a model for addressing fair and efficient allocation of a divisible, heterogeneous resource (metaphorically, the cake) among agents with distinct preferences. Focusing on a standard formulation of…