Related papers: Protocol indepedence through disjoint encryption u…
Type-flaw attacks and multi-protocol attacks on security protocols have been frequently reported in the literature. Heather et al. and Guttman et al. have proven that these could be prevented by tagging encrypted components with distinct…
Type-flaw attacks upon security protocols wherein agents are led to misinterpret message types have been reported frequently in the literature. Preventing them is crucial for protocol security and verification. Heather et al. proved that…
In this paper, we show a new tagging scheme for cryptographic protocol messages. Under this tagging, equational theories of operators such as exclusive-or, binary addition etc. are effectively disabled, when terms are unified. We believe…
In security protocol analysis, the traditional choice to consider a single Dolev-Yao attacker is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating Dolev-Yao attackers have been shown to be reducible to models with one Dolev-Yao…
Attacks on classical cryptographic protocols are usually modeled by allowing an adversary to ask queries from an oracle. Security is then defined by requiring that as long as the queries satisfy some constraint, there is some problem the…
We study the complexity of securely evaluating arithmetic circuits over finite rings. This question is motivated by natural secure computation tasks. Focusing mainly on the case of two-party protocols with security against malicious…
Based on our previous work on truly concurrent process algebras APTC, we use it to verify the security protocols. This work (called Secure APTC, abbreviated SAPTC) have the following advantages in verifying security protocols: (1) It has a…
We give an exponential separation between one-way quantum and classical communication protocols for a partial Boolean function (a variant of the Boolean Hidden Matching Problem of Bar-Yossef et al.) Earlier such an exponential separation…
We present six multiparty protocols with information-theoretic security that tolerate an arbitrary number of corrupt participants. All protocols assume pairwise authentic private channels and a broadcast channel (in a single case, we…
A Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol based on coding theory for a single server is proposed. It provides computational security against linear algebra attacks, addressing the main drawback of previous PIR proposals based on coding…
We consider the problem of intruder deduction in security protocol analysis: that is, deciding whether a given message $M$ can be deduced from a set of messages $\Gamma$ under the theory of blind signatures and arbitrary convergent…
The fairness of a secure multi-party quantum key agreement (MQKA) protocol requires that all involved parties are entirely peer entities and can equally influence the outcome of the protocol to establish a shared key wherein no one can…
Recently, a quantum multi-party summation protocol based on the quantum Fourier transform has been proposed [Quantum Inf Process 17: 129, 2018]. The protocol claims to be secure against both outside and participant attacks. However, a…
Several of the basic cryptographic constructs have associated algebraic structures. Formal models proposed by Dolev and Yao to study the (unconditional) security of public key protocols form a group. The security of some types of protocols…
In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic protocol analysis, cryptographic protocols and (Dolev-Yao) intruders are modeled by Horn theories and security analysis boils down to solving the derivation problem for Horn theories. This…
Recently, Liu and Yin (Int. J. Theor. Phys. 60, 2074-2083 (2021)) proposed a two-party private set intersection protocol based on quantum Fourier transform. We find the participant can deduce the other party's private information, which…
Security protocols are used in many of our daily-life applications, and our privacy largely depends on their design. Formal verification techniques have proved their usefulness to analyse these protocols, but they become so complex that…
We present a different proof of the insecurity problem for XOR, solved in by Chevalier, Kuesters, Rusinowitch and Turuani (2005). Our proof uses the notion of typed terms and well-typed proofs, and removes a restriction on the class of…
Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…
We present three simple and efficient protocol constructions to solve Yao's Millionaire Problem when the parties involved are non-colluding and semi-honest. The first construction uses a partially homomorphic Encryption Scheme and is a…