Related papers: Strategic Cooperation in Cost Sharing Games
Recently, strategic games inspired by Schelling's influential model of residential segregation have been studied in the TCS and AI literature. In these games, agents of k different types occupy the nodes of a network topology aiming to…
The winning condition of a parity game with costs requires an arbitrary, but fixed bound on the cost incurred between occurrences of odd colors and the next occurrence of a larger even one. Such games quantitatively extend parity games…
The allocation of computing tasks for networked distributed services poses a question to service providers on whether centralized allocation management be worth its cost. Existing analytical models were conceived for users accessing…
We study non-atomic congestion games on parallel-link networks with affine cost functions. We investigate the power of machine-learned predictions in the design of coordination mechanisms aimed at minimizing the impact of selfishness. Our…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
This paper discusses a special type of multi-user communication scenario, in which users' utilities are linearly impacted by their competitors' actions. First, we explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium and Pareto boundary of the…
Facility location games have been a topic of major interest in economics, operations research and computer science, starting from the seminal work by Hotelling. Spatial facility location models have successfully predicted the outcome of…
We study the computation of approximate pure Nash equilibria in Shapley value (SV) weighted congestion games, introduced in [19]. This class of games considers weighted congestion games in which Shapley values are used as an alternative (to…
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…
Sharing economy is a transformative socio-economic phenomenon built around the idea of sharing underused resources and services, e.g. transportation and housing, thereby reducing costs and extracting value. Anticipating continued reduction…
In this paper, we present and analyze the properties of a new class of games - the spatial congestion game (SCG), which is a generalization of the classical congestion game (CG). In a classical congestion game, multiple users share the same…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
We consider a multilevel network game, where nodes can improve their communication costs by connecting to a high-speed network. The $n$ nodes are connected by a static network and each node can decide individually to become a gateway to the…
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of…
We study competitive resource allocation problems in which players distribute their demands integrally on a set of resources subject to player-specific submodular capacity constraints. Each player has to pay for each unit of demand a cost…
In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network systems, content (object) delivery between nodes is often required. One way to study such a distributed system is by defining games, which involve selfish nodes that make strategic choices on replicating…
Concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) are an ideal formalism for modelling probabilistic systems that feature multiple players or components with distinct objectives making concurrent, rational decisions. Examples include communication or…
In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…
We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…
One of the most appealing aspects of the (coarse) correlated equilibrium concept is that natural dynamics quickly arrive at approximations of such equilibria, even in games with many players. In addition, there exist polynomial-time…