Related papers: Security Games with Decision and Observation Error…

We study security games in which a defender commits to a mixed strategy for protecting a finite set of targets of different values. An attacker, knowing the defender's strategy, chooses which target to attack and for how long. If the…

Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice.…

In this paper we consider a Target-guarding differential game where the Defender must protect a linearly moving line segment by intercepting the Attacker who tries to reach it. In contrast to common Target-guarding problems, we assume that…

We study observation-based strategies for two-player turn-based games on graphs with omega-regular objectives. An observation-based strategy relies on imperfect information about the history of a play, namely, on the past sequence of…

Stochastic games combine controllable and adversarial non-determinism with stochastic behavior and are a common tool in control, verification and synthesis of reactive systems facing uncertainty. Multi-objective stochastic games are natural…

We examine the problem of the existence of optimal deterministic stationary strategiesintwo-players antagonistic (zero-sum) perfect information stochastic games with finitely many states and actions.We show that the existenceof such…

In this paper we analyse two-player games by their response graphs. The response graph has nodes which are strategy profiles, with an arc between profiles if they differ in the strategy of a single player, with the direction of the arc…

We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…

This paper studies a variant of multi-player reach-avoid game played between intruders and defenders. The intruder team tries to score by sending as many intruders as possible to the target area, while the defender team tries to minimize…

There are $n$ players who compete by timing their actions. An opportunity appears randomly on a time interval. Whoever takes an action the fastest after the opportunity has arisen wins. The occurrence of the opportunity is observed only…

We define a game on 1-safe Petri nets, where a user plays against an environment in order to reach a goal on the system. The goal is expressed through an LTL-X formula, and represents a behaviour of the system that the user needs to…

In dynamic noncooperative games, each player makes conjectures about other players' reactions before choosing a strategy. However, resulting equilibria may be multiple and do not always lead to desirable outcomes. These issues are typically…

Stackelberg security games are a critical tool for maximizing the utility of limited defense resources to protect important targets from an intelligent adversary. Motivated by green security, where the defender may only observe an…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

We investigate a repeated two-player zero-sum game setting where the column player is also a designer of the system, and has full control on the design of the payoff matrix. In addition, the row player uses a no-regret algorithm to…

In this paper, we study a non-zero-sum game with two players, where each of the players plays what we call Bermudan strategies and optimizes a general non-linear assessment functional of the pay-off. By using a recursive construction, we…

In this paper, we consider a privacy signaling game problem for binary alphabets and single-bit transmission where a transmitter has a pair of messages, one of which is a casual message that needs to be conveyed, whereas the other message…

Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system…

This work introduces a unified framework for analyzing games in greater depth. In the existing literature, players' strategies are typically assigned scalar values, and equilibrium concepts are used to identify compatible choices. However,…

The behaviour of multi-agent learning in competitive settings is often considered under the restrictive assumption of a zero-sum game. Only under this strict requirement is the behaviour of learning well understood; beyond this, learning…