Related papers: Stochastic Games for Security in Networks with Int…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…

Security games model the confrontation between a defender protecting a set of targets and an attacker who tries to capture them. A variant of these games assumes security interdependence between targets, facilitating contagion of an attack.…

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…

We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…

In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic model that assesses the cyber-security risk of cloud networks and informs security experts on the optimal security strategies. Our approach combines game theory, combinatorial optimization, and…

Stochastic patrol routing is known to be advantageous in adversarial settings; however, the optimal choice of stochastic routing strategy is dependent on a model of the adversary. We adopt a worst-case omniscient adversary model from the…

In this paper, we consider a new network security game wherein an attacker and a defender are battling over "multiple" targets. This type of game is appropriate to model many current network security conflicts such as Internet phishing,…

Selecting the combination of security controls that will most effectively protect a system's assets is a difficult task. If the wrong controls are selected, the system may be left vulnerable to cyber-attacks that can impact the…

This paper deals with the detection and prediction of losses due to cyber attacks waged on vital networks. The accumulation of losses to a network during a series of attacks is modeled by a 2-dimensional monotone random walk process as…

We consider a system consisting of multiple interdependent assets, and a set of defenders, each responsible for securing a subset of the assets against an attacker. The interdependencies between the assets are captured by an attack graph,…

This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each…

This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks. The system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on…

The adoption of reinforcement learning for critical infrastructure defense introduces a vulnerability where sophisticated attackers can strategically exploit the defense algorithm's learning dynamics. While prior work addresses this…

A cyber security problem in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game-theoretic approach is considered. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes…

We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…

We introduce a novel framework for computing optimal randomized security policies in networked domains which extends previous approaches in several ways. First, we extend previous linear programming techniques for Stackelberg security games…

This paper studies a stochastic dynamic game between two competing teams, each consisting of a network of collaborating agents. Unlike fully cooperative settings, where all agents share a common objective, each team in this game aims to…

We propose interdependent defense (IDD) games, a computational game-theoretic framework to study aspects of the interdependence of risk and security in multi-agent systems under deliberate external attacks. Our model builds upon…

Technology development efforts in autonomy and cyber-defense have been evolving independently of each other, over the past decade. In this paper, we report our ongoing effort to integrate these two presently distinct areas into a single…