Related papers: Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero…

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

The model of congestion games is widely used to analyze games related to traffic and communication. A central property of these games is that they are potential games and hence posses a pure Nash equilibrium. In reality it is often the case…

We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other…

Finite games in normal form and their mixed extensions are a corner stone of noncooperative game theory. Often generic finite games and their mixed extensions are considered. But the properties which one expects in generic games and the…

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…

We consider potential games with mixed-integer variables, for which we propose two distributed, proximal-like equilibrium seeking algorithms. Specifically, we focus on two scenarios: i) the underlying game is generalized ordinal and the…

Recently, a new model extending the standard replicator equation to a finite set of players connected on an arbitrary graph was developed in evolutionary game dynamics. The players are interpreted as subpopulations of multipopulations…

Unlike normal-form games, where correlated equilibria have been studied for more than 45 years, extensive-form correlation is still generally not well understood. Part of the reason for this gap is that the sequential nature of…

We consider a repeated Matching Pennies game in which players have limited access to randomness. Playing the (unique) Nash equilibrium in this n-stage game requires n random bits. Can there be Nash equilibria that use less than n random…

We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, where the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy augmented by a fixed non-negative bonus for picking a given…

We consider a large population dynamic game in discrete time. The peculiarity of the game is that players are characterized by time-evolving types, and so reasonably their actions should not anticipate the future values of their types. When…

When modeling robot interactions as Nash equilibrium problems, it is desirable to place coupled constraints which restrict these interactions to be safe and acceptable (for instance, to avoid collisions). Such games are continuous with…

We consider evolutionary dynamics for population games in which players have a continuum of strategies at their disposal. Models in this setting amount to infinite-dimensional differential equations evolving on the manifold of probability…

We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…

Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents' surplus (expected sum of payo s) is…

We define and analyze the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium for nonatomic aggregative games with an infinity of players types. These equilibria are characterized through an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. We show, under…

We prove that finding an epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a succinctly representable game with many players is PPAD-hard for constant epsilon. Our proof uses succinct games, i.e. games whose payoff function is represented by a circuit. Our…

We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect…

We study lower bounds on the query complexity of determining correlated equilibrium. In particular, we consider a query model in which an n-player game is specified via a black box that returns players' utilities at pure action profiles. In…

We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…