Related papers: On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games
Let $V$ be a multiset of $n$ points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, which we call voters, and let $k\geq 1$ and $\ell\geq 1$ be two given constants. We consider the following game, where two players $\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{Q}$ compete over the…
This paper describes a quantum algorithm for efficiently decomposing finite Abelian groups. Such a decomposition is needed in order to apply the Abelian hidden subgroup algorithm. Such a decomposition (assuming the Generalized Riemann…
We explain a highly efficient algorithm for playing the simplest type of dots and boxes endgame optimally (by which we mean "in such a way so as to maximise the number of boxes that you take"). The algorithm is sufficiently simple that it…
Estimating discrete games of complete information is often computationally difficult due to partial identification and the absence of closed-form moment characterizations. This paper proposes computationally tractable approaches to…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
Advances in generative modeling and adversarial learning have given rise to renewed interest in smooth games. However, the absence of symmetry in the matrix of second derivatives poses challenges that are not present in the classical…
Complementarity problems often permit distinct solutions, a fact of major significance in optimization, game theory and other fields. In this paper, we develop a numerical technique for computing multiple isolated solutions of…
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general…
With increasing game size, a problem of computational complexity arises. This is especially true in real world problems such as in social systems, where there is a significant population of players involved in the game, and the complexity…
We introduce variants of Barvinok's algorithm for counting lattice points in polyhedra. The new algorithms are based on irrational signed decomposition in the primal space and the construction of rational generating functions for cones with…
We prove two "master" convolution theorems for multivariate determinantal polynomials. The methods used include basic properties of what we call a "minor-orthogonal" ensemble as well as properties of the mixed discriminant of matrices. We…
We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash equilibrium of a two-player, bilinear game with a bounded payoff matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times n}$, when the players' strategies are constrained to lie in simple sets. We…
History-deterministic automata are a restricted class of nondeterministic automata where the nondeterminism while reading an input can be resolved successfully based on the prefix read so far. History-deterministic automata are…
We use simplicial complexes to model simple games as well as weighted voting games where certain coalitions are considered impossible. Topological characterizations of various ideas from simple games are provided, as are the expressions for…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
In this paper, we extend the Descent framework, which enables learning and planning in the context of two-player games with perfect information, to the framework of stochastic games. We propose two ways of doing this, the first way…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…
Concavity and its refinements underpin tractability in multiplayer games, where players independently choose actions to maximize their own payoffs which depend on other players' actions. In concave games, where players' strategy sets are…
We present an algorithm that computes approximate pure Nash equilibria in a broad class of constraint satisfaction games that generalize the well-known cut and party affiliation games. Our results improve previous ones by Bhalgat et al.~(EC…
Consider concurrent, infinite duration, two-player win/lose games played on graphs. If the winning condition satisfies some simple requirement, the existence of Player 1 winning (finite-memory) strategies is equivalent to the existence of…