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In the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, agents play with each other and update their strategies in every generation according to some microscopic dynamical rule. In its spatial version, agents do not play with every other but,…
Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social behaviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy concentrations can be derived from the players'…
This article investigates an evolutionary game based on the framework of interacting particle systems. Each point of the square lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one of two possible strategies and is attributed a…
Partner selection is an important process in many social interactions, permitting individuals to decrease the risks associated with cooperation. In large populations, defectors may escape punishment by roving from partner to partner, but…
The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…
Since Press and Dyson's ingenious discovery of ZD (zero-determinant) strategy in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, several studies have confirmed the existence of ZD strategy in repeated multiplayer social dilemmas. However, few…
The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained…
Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…
Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to better understand how evolving individual choices to be…
Punishment is a common tactic to sustain cooperation and has been extensively studied for a long time. While most of previous game-theoretic work adopt the imitation learning where players imitate the strategies who are better off, the…
Repeated interaction between individuals is the main mechanism for maintaining cooperation in social dilemma situations. Variants of tit-for-tat (repeating the previous action of the opponent) and the win-stay lose-shift strategy are known…
Evolutionary $2 \times 2$ games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability…
We consider a dual model of decision making, in which an individual forms its opinion based on contrasting mechanisms of imitation and rational calculation. The decision making model (DMM) implements imitating behavior by means of a network…
A simple model for cooperation between "selfish" agents, which play an extended version of the Prisoner's Dilemma(PD) game, in which they use arbitrary payoffs, is presented and studied. A continuous variable, representing the probability…
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary process we consider is given by the replicator…
Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game among self-driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at…
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial Prisoner's dilemma games with and without extortion by adopting aspiration-driven strategy updating rule. We focus explicitly on how the strategy updating manner (whether synchronous or…
Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…
We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally…