Related papers: Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator d…
In Mean Field Games of Controls, the dynamics of the single agent is influenced not only by the distribution of the agents, as in the classical theory, but also by the distribution of their optimal strategies. In this paper, we study…
To demonstrate the usefulness of physical approaches for the study of realistic economic systems, we investigate the inequality of players' wealth in one of the most extensively studied econophysical models, namely, the minority game (MG).…
In mix-game which is an extension of minority game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority game, but the group2 plays the minority game. This paper studies the change of the average winnings of agents and volatilities vs.…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game…
Many complex adaptive systems contain a large diversity of specialized components. The specialization at the level of the microscopic degrees of freedom, and diversity at the level of the system as a whole are phenomena that appear during…
Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical toolkit to analyse the interactions that an individual agent has in a population and how the composition of strategies in this population evolves over time. While it can provide neat solutions to…
We study the phase diagram of a minority game where three classes of agents are present. Two types of agents play a risk-loving game that we model by the standard Snowdrift Game. The behaviour of the third type of agents is coded by {\em…
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundance of the various strategies in the population. Here we study general games among n strategies in populations of large but finite size. We…
We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…
We present an agent-based model inspired by the Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG), albeit strongly adapted to the case of competition for limited resources in ecology. The agents in this game become able, after some time, to predict the a…
Generalization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of…
Evolutionary game dynamics is one of the most fruitful frameworks for studying evolution in different disciplines, from Biology to Economics. Within this context, the approach of choice for many researchers is the so-called replicator…
We analyze from basic physical considerations the Darwinian competition for reproduction (evolutionary dynamics) of strategists in a Public Goods Game, the archetype for $n$-agent (group) economical and biological interactions. In the…
People tend to align their use of language to the linguistic behaviour of their own ingroup and to simultaneously diverge from the language use of outgroups. This paper proposes to model this phenomenon of sociolinguistic identity…
The study of societies of adaptive agents seeking minority status is an active area of research. Recently, it has been demonstrated that such systems display an intriguing phase-transition: agents tend to {\it self-segregate} or to {\it…
We study the interaction between strategy, heterogeneity and growth in a two-agent model of capital accumulation. Preferences are represented by recursive utility functions with decreasing marginal impatience. The stationary equilibria of…
This article introduces a novel mean-field game model for multi-sector economic growth in which a dynamically evolving externality, influenced by the collective actions of agents, plays a central role. Building on classical growth theories…