Related papers: Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator d…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We introduce a simple model of opinion dynamics in which binary-state agents evolve due to the influence of agents in a local neighborhood. In a single update step, a fixed-size group is defined and all agents in the group adopt the state…
The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
We present a simple game which mimics the complex dynamics found in most natural and social systems. Intelligent players modify their strategies periodically, depending on their performances. We propose that the agents use hybridized…
We study adaptive dynamics in games where players abandon the population at a given rate, and are replaced by naive players characterized by a prior distribution over the admitted strategies. We demonstrate how such process leads…
In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. However, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as…
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are two fields that, at first glance, might seem distinct, but they have notable connections and intersections. The former focuses on the evolution of behaviors (or strategies)…
This work introduces the concept of Variable Size Game Theory (VSGT), in which the number of players in a game is a strategic decision made by the players themselves. We start by discussing the main examples in game theory: dominance,…
We analyze a simple model of adaptive competition which captures essential features of a variety of adaptive competitive systems in the social and biological sciences. Each of N agents, at each time step of a game, joins one of two groups.…
The modelling of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations requires microscopic processes that determine how strategies spread. The exact details of these processes are often chosen without much further consideration. Different types…
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…
Minority game is a simple-mined econophysical model capturing the cooperative behavior among selfish players. Previous investigations, which were based on numerical simulations up to about 100 players for a certain parameter $\alpha$ in the…
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a…
Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows to introduce elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase…
Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are ubiquitous in social and economic systems. These claims emerge from the analysis of individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated.…
Recent techniques based on Mean Field Games (MFGs) allow the scalable analysis of multi-player games with many similar, rational agents. However, standard MFGs remain limited to homogeneous players that weakly influence each other, and…
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a…
We present the first study of a dynamical quantum game. Each agent has a `memory' of her performance over the previous m timesteps, and her strategy can evolve in time. The game exhibits distinct regimes of optimality. For small m the…