Related papers: On the Complexity of Envy-Free Cake Cutting
The paper considers fair allocation of resources that are already allocated in an unfair way. This setting requires a careful balance between the fairness considerations and the rights of the present owners. The paper presents re-division…
In this article we suggest a model of computation for the cake cutting problem. In this model the mediator can ask the same queries as in the Robertson-Webb model but he or she can only perform algebraic operations as in the Blum-Shub-Smale…
We consider the fair division problem of indivisible items. It is well-known that an envy-free allocation may not exist, and a relaxed version of envy-freeness, envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), has been widely considered. In an EF1…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods and chores under category constraints. Specifically, there are $n$ agents and $m$ indivisible items which are partitioned into categories with associated capacities. An allocation…
We study the existence of fair distributions when we have more guests than pieces to allocate, focusing on envy-free distributions among those who receive a piece. The conditions on the demand from the guests can be weakened from those of…
In a graph, a matching cut is an edge cut that is a matching. Matching Cut is the problem of deciding whether or not a given graph has a matching cut, which is known to be NP-complete even when restricted to bipartite graphs. It has been…
In a graph, a perfect matching cut is an edge cut that is a perfect matching. Perfect Matching Cut (PMC) is the problem of deciding whether a given graph has a perfect matching cut, and is known to be NP-complete. We revisit the problem and…
We analyze the computational complexity of several new variants of edge-matching puzzles. First we analyze inequality (instead of equality) constraints between adjacent tiles, proving the problem NP-complete for strict inequalities but…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…
We consider the classic cake cutting problem in the Robertson-Webb model, with the objective of proportional fairness. We show that any randomized algorithm must use $\Omega(n \log n)$ queries.
The Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism -- also known as the simultaneous eating algorithm -- is a canonical solution for the random assignment problem under ordinal preferences. It guarantees envy-freeness and ordinal efficiency in the…
The current practice of envy-free rent division, lead by the fair allocation website Spliddit, is based on quasi-linear preferences. These preferences rule out agents' well documented financial constraints. To resolve this issue we consider…
We study the envy-free house allocation problem when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the…
We consider the following control problem on fair allocation of indivisible goods. Given a set $I$ of items and a set of agents, each having strict linear preference over the items, we ask for a minimum subset of the items whose deletion…
We consider the problem of reforming an envy-free matching when each agent is assigned a single item. Given an envy-free matching, we consider an operation to exchange the item of an agent with an unassigned item preferred by the agent that…
We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show…
We study the problem of fairly assigning a set of discrete tasks (or chores) among a set of agents with additive valuations. Each chore is associated with a start and finish time, and each agent can perform at most one chore at any given…
We consider the house allocation problem, where $m$ houses are to be assigned to $n$ agents so that each agent gets exactly one house. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether an envy-free assignment exists, and if so,…
We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a multiset $\mathcal{M}$ of $t$ types of indivisible items among $d$ groups of agents, where all agents within a group have identical additive valuations. Gorantla et al. [GMV23] showed…
In the PATH COVER problem, one asks to cover the vertices of a graph using the smallest possible number of (not necessarily disjoint) paths. While the variant where the paths need to be pairwise vertex-disjoint, which we call PATH…