A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget
Computer Science and Game Theory
2020-02-11 v1 Theoretical Economics
Abstract
The current practice of envy-free rent division, lead by the fair allocation website Spliddit, is based on quasi-linear preferences. These preferences rule out agents' well documented financial constraints. To resolve this issue we consider piece-wise linear budget constrained preferences. These preferences admit differences in agents' marginal disutility of paying rent below and above a given reference, i.e., a soft budget. We construct a polynomial algorithm to calculate a maxmin utility envy-free allocation, and other related solutions, in this domain.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2002.02966,
title = {A polynomial algorithm for maxmin and minmax envy-free rent division on a soft budget},
author = {Rodrigo A. Velez},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.02966},
year = {2020}
}
Comments
arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1902.02935