Related papers: Playing With Population Protocols
In this paper, we deal with some specific domains of applications to game theory. This is one of the major class of models in the new approaches of modelling in the economic domain. For that, we use genetic automata which allow to buid…
Objective: The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured - i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the entire…
Epidemiological models are an important tool in coping with epidemics, as they offer a forecast, even if often simplistic, of the behavior of the disease in the population. This allows responsible health agencies to organize themselves and…
We study a modified version of the Naming Game, a recently introduced model which describes how shared vocabulary can emerge spontaneously in a population without any central control. In particular, we introduce a new mechanism that allows…
We partially modify the rules of the Minority Game (MG) by introducing some degree of local information in the game, which is only available for some agents, called the interacting agents. Our work shows that, for small values of the new…
In this paper, we study a model of network formation in large populations. Each agent can choose the strength of interaction (i.e. connection) with other agents to find a Nash equilibrium. Different from the recently-developed theory of…
In this work, our goal is to train agents that can coordinate with seen, unseen as well as human partners in a multi-agent communication environment involving natural language. Previous work using a single set of agents has shown great…
In Mean Field Games of Controls, the dynamics of the single agent is influenced not only by the distribution of the agents, as in the classical theory, but also by the distribution of their optimal strategies. In this paper, we study…
In this paper we investigate the computational power of Population Protocols (PP) under some unreliable and/or weaker interaction models. More precisely, we focus on two features related to the power of interactions: omission failures and…
The central problems in social sciences concern the social and psychological mechanisms and conditions required for the emergence and stability of human groups. The present article is dedicated to the problem of stability of human groups.…
We consider the problem of the evolution of a code within a structured population of agents. The agents try to maximise their information about their environment by acquiring information from the outputs of other agents in the population. A…
Economic ensembles can be modeled as networks of interacting agents whose be-haviors are described in terms of game theory. The evolutionary paradigm has been applied to two-person games to discover strategies in this context.…
The aim of this manuscript is to contain the arguments and define the theoretical objects for building a general framework to model population dynamics from the ground up, relying mainly on the probabilistic landscapes defining the dynamics…
The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination…
Epidemiological models increasingly rely on self-reported behavioral data such as vaccination status, mask usage, and social distancing adherence to forecast disease transmission and assess the impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions…
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…
We study here the dynamics (and stability) of Probabilistic Population Protocols, via the differential equations approach. We provide a quite general model and we show that it includes the model of Angluin et. al. in the case of very large…
We introduce a new model involving TU-games and exogenous structures. Specifically, we consider that each player in a population can choose an element in a strategy set and that, for every possible strategy profile, a TU-game is associated…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
In this work, we initiate the study of \emph{smoothed analysis} of population protocols. We consider a population protocol model where an adaptive adversary dictates the interactions between agents, but with probability $p$ every such…