Related papers: More on the pressing down game

Let $S$ be the set of those $\alpha\in\omega_2$ that have cofinality $\omega_1$. It is consistent relative to a measurable that the nonempty player wins the pressing down game of length $\omega_1$, but not the Banach Mazur game of length…

This paper tackles the problem of adversarial examples from a game theoretic point of view. We study the open question of the existence of mixed Nash equilibria in the zero-sum game formed by the attacker and the classifier. While previous…

We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…

Telg\'arsky's conjecture states that for each $k \in \mathbb N$, there is a topological space $X_k$ such that in the Banach-Mazur game on $X_k$, the player {\scriptsize NONEMPTY} has a winning $(k+1)$-tactic but no winning $k$-tactic. We…

We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…

We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…

We formulate and study a two-player static duel game as a nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game. Players $P_{1},P_{2}$ are standing in place and, in each turn, one or both may shoot at the other player. If $P_{n}$ shoots at $P_{m}$ ($m\neq…

Two-player stochastic games are games with two 2 players and a randomised entity called "nature". A natural question to ask in this framework is the existence of strategies that ensure that an event happens with probability 1 (almost-sure…

We investigate how well continuous-time fictitious play in two-player games performs in terms of average payoff, particularly compared to Nash equilibrium payoff. We show that in many games, fictitious play outperforms Nash equilibrium on…

We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…

Motivated by the scarcity of accurate payoff feedback in practical applications of game theory, we examine a class of learning dynamics where players adjust their choices based on past payoff observations that are subject to noise and…

In finite games mixed Nash equilibria always exist, but pure equilibria may fail to exist. To assess the relevance of this nonexistence, we consider games where the payoffs are drawn at random. In particular, we focus on games where a large…

We investigate mean-field games from the point of view of a large number of indistinguishable players which eventually converges to infinity. The players are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. The dynamics of the states of the…

We present for every $n\ge4$ an $n$-player game in normal form with payoffs in $\{0,1,2\}$ that has a unique, fully mixed, Nash equilibrium in which all the probability weights are irradical (i.e., algebraic but not closed form expressible…

It is well known that if the nonempty player of the Banach-Mazur game has a winning strategy on a space, then that space is Baire in all powers even in the box topology. The converse of this implication may be true also: We know of no…

We consider the class of two-person ordinal potential games where each player has the same number of actions $K$. Each game in this class admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium and the best-response dynamics converges to one of these…

We study infinite asymptotic games in Banach spaces with an F.D.D. and prove that analytic games are determined by characterising precisely the conditions for the players to have winning strategies. These results are applied to characterise…

We consider finite two-player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p in [0, 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p…

Subgame perfect equilibria are specific Nash equilibria in perfect information games in extensive form. They are important because they relate to the rationality of the players. They always exist in infinite games with continuous…

Given a free ideal J of subsets of a set X, we consider games where player ONE plays an increasing sequence of elements of the sigma completion of J, and TWO tries to cover the union of this sequence by playing one set at a time from J. We…