Related papers: Towards Barter Double Auction as Model for Bilater…

We introduce a system of kinetic equations describing an exchange market consisting of two populations of agents (dealers and speculators) expressing the same preferences for two goods, but applying different strategies in their exchanges.…

We provide simple models for the utility function (or psychology) of an actor trading a multitude of goods for money. In this framework, money has no intrinsic consumption value, but is required as a medium of exchange. A collection of such…

We examine the tuning of cooperative behavior in repeated multi-agent games using an analytically tractable, continuous-time, nonlinear model of opinion dynamics. Each modeled agent updates its real-valued opinion about each available…

We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…

Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…

A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…

Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such…

As Aumann stated, cooperation and non-cooperation are different ways of viewing the same game, with the main difference being whether players can reach a binding cooperative agreement. In the real world, many games often coexist competition…

Game-theoretic models relevant for computer science applications usually feature a large number of players. The goal of this paper is to develop an analytical framework for bounding the price of anarchy in such models. We demonstrate the…

In settings where full incentive-compatibility is not available, such as core-constraint combinatorial auctions and budget-balanced combinatorial exchanges, we may wish to design mechanisms that are as incentive-compatible as possible. This…

Welfare maximization in bilateral trade has been extensively studied in recent years. Previous literature obtained incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms only for the private values case. In this paper, we study welfare maximization…

We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…

I construct a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a…

Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…

Ambient Intelligence aims to offer personalized services and easier ways of interaction between people and systems. Since several users and systems may coexist in these environments, it is quite possible that entities with opposing…

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…

We investigate a market without money in which agents can offer certain goods (or multiple copies of an agent-specific good) in exchange for goods of other agents. The exchange must be balanced in the sense that each agent should receive a…

Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper we study natural combinatorial contract settings involving…

In economics, there are many ways to describe the interaction between a "seller" and a "buyer". The most common one, with which we interact almost every day, is selling for a fixed price. This option is perfect for selling a mass product,…

Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…