Related papers: Decision Problems for Nash Equilibria in Stochasti…

We propose a new dynamics for equilibrium selection of finite player discrete strategy games. The dynamics is motivated by optimal transportation, and models individual players' myopicity, greedy and uncertainty when making decisions. The…

Nash equilibria are defined using uncorrelated behavioural or mixed joint probability distributions effectively assuming that players of bounded rationality must discard information to locate equilibria. We propose instead that rational…

This paper is related to nonzero-sum stochastic differential games in the Markovian framework. We show existence of a Nash equilibrium point for the game when the drift is no longer bounded and only satisfies a linear growth condition. The…

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…

We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…

We introduce a novel class of Nash equilibrium seeking dynamics for non-cooperative games with a finite number of players, where the convergence to the Nash equilibrium is bounded by a KL function with a settling time that can be upper…

We show that under some general conditions the finite memory determinacy of a class of two-player win/lose games played on finite graphs implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium built from finite memory strategies for the corresponding…

We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…

We study the structure of the set of equilibrium payoffs in finite games, both for Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium. A nonempty subset of R^2 is shown to be the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of a bimatrix game if and only if it…

Is there an algorithm that takes a game in normal form as input, and outputs a Nash equilibrium? If the payoffs are integers, the answer is yes, and lot of work has been done in its computational complexity. If the payoffs are permitted to…

The theory of quantum games permits players to choose strategies that prepare and measure quantum states. Whereas conventional game theory provides guarantees for fixed-point stability in non-cooperative games, so-called Nash equilibria, we…

Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…

This work proposes a novel set of techniques for approximating a Nash equilibrium in a finite, normal-form game. It achieves this by constructing a new reformulation as solving a parameterized system of multivariate polynomials with tunable…

In evolutionary game theory, it is customary to be partial to the dynamical models possessing fixed points so that they may be understood as the attainment of evolutionary stability, and hence, Nash equilibrium. Any show of periodic or…

We consider two-player normal form games where each player has the same finite strategy set. The payoffs of each player are assumed to be i.i.d. random variables with a continuous distribution. We show that, with high probability, the…

We investigate the complexity of bounding the uncertainty of graphical games, and we provide new insight into the intrinsic difficulty of computing Nash equilibria. In particular, we show that, if one adds very simple and natural additional…

We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by…

Game theory has emerged as a powerful framework for modeling a large range of multi-agent scenarios. Many algorithmic solutions require discrete, finite games with payoffs that have a closed-form specification. In contrast, many real-world…

Boolean games are an expressive and natural formalism through which to investigate problems of strategic interaction in multiagent systems. Although they have been widely studied, almost all previous work on Nash equilibria in Boolean games…