Related papers: Manipulating Scrip Systems: Sybils and Collusion
A model of providing service in a P2P network is analyzed. It is shown that by adding a scrip system, a mechanism that admits a reasonable Nash equilibrium that reduces free riding can be obtained. The effect of varying the total amount of…
Scrip, or artificial currency, is a useful tool for designing systems that are robust to selfish behavior by users. However, it also introduces problems for a system designer, such as how the amount of money in the system should be set. In…
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
In a multi-agent system, transitioning from a centralized to a distributed decision-making strategy can introduce vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We study the potential for adversarial manipulation in a class of graphical…
We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…
The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation technologies, we can consider new collaborative decision-making…
In this paper, we study distributed consensus in synchronous systems subject to both unexpected crash failures and strategic manipulations by rational agents in the system. We adapt the concept of collusion-resistant Nash equilibrium to…
The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or…
In a social network, individuals express their opinions on several interdependent topics, and therefore the evolution of their opinions on these topics is also mutually dependent. In this work, we propose a differential game model for the…
We study a class of games in which a finite number of agents each controls a quantity of flow to be routed through a network, and are able to split their own flow between multiple paths through the network. Recent work on this model has…
A noncooperative differential (dynamic) game model of opinion dynamics is proposed. In this game, the agents' motives are shaped by their expectations of the nature of others' opinions as well as how susceptible they are to get influenced…
We discuss the design of efficient scrip systems and develop tools for empirically analyzing them. For those interested in the empirical study of scrip systems, we demonstrate how characteristics of agents in a system can be inferred from…
Current research in distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in the partial information setting assumes that information is exchanged between agents that are "truthful". However, in general noncooperative games agents may consider sending…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
We consider a gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in a distributed multi-player network game. We extend previous results on Nash equilibrium seeking to the case when the players' cost functions may be affected by the actions of…
Correlated equilibria arise naturally when agents communicate or rely on intermediaries such as recommendation systems. We study when a given Nash equilibrium can be improved within the set of correlated equilibria for general objectives.…
We propose a new variant of the strategic classification problem: a principal reveals a classifier, and $n$ agents report their (possibly manipulated) features to be classified. Motivated by real-world applications, our model crucially…
Examining the behavior of multi-agent systems is vitally important to many emerging distributed applications - game theory has emerged as a powerful tool set in which to do so. The main approach of game-theoretic techniques is to model…