Related papers: The role of a matchmaker in buyer-vendor interacti…

We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…

We propose a model of two-way selection system. It appears in the processes like choosing a mate between men and women, making contracts between job hunters and recruiters, and trading between buyers and sellers. In this paper, we propose a…

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…

We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium…

Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability…

A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…

Matching markets, where agents are assigned to one another based on preferences and capacity constraints, are pervasive in various domains. This paper introduces MATWA (https://matwa.optimalmatching.com), a web application offering a rich…

We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…

We have studied here the self-organising features of the dynamics of a model market, where the agents `trade' for a single commodity with their money. The model market consists of fixed numbers of economic agents, money supply and…

Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…

In real life situations often paired comparisons involving alternatives of either full or partial profiles to mitigate cognitive burden are presented. For this situation the problem of finding optimal designs is considered in the presence…

Interaction strategies for reward in competitive environments are significantly influenced by the nature and extent of available information. In financial markets, particularly foreign exchange (forex), traders operate independently with…

Recommender systems (RS) mediate human experience online. Most RS act to optimize metrics that are imperfectly aligned with the best-interest of users but are easy to measure, like ad-clicks and user engagement. This has resulted in a host…

While the auto-bidding literature predominantly considers independent bidding, we investigate the coordination problem among multiple auto-bidders in online advertising platforms. Two motivating scenarios are: collaborative bidding among…

Contemporary recommender systems act as intermediaries on multi-sided platforms serving high utility recommendations from sellers to buyers. Such systems attempt to balance the objectives of multiple stakeholders including sellers, buyers,…

Our work introduces the effect of supply/demand imbalances into the literature on online matching with stochastic rewards in bipartite graphs. We provide a parameterized definition that characterizes instances as over- or undersupplied (or…

Following the recent literature on make take fees policies, we consider an exchange wishing to set a suitable contract with several market makers in order to improve trading quality on its platform. To do so, we use a principal-agent…

We consider a monopolistic seller in a market that may be segmented. The surplus of each consumer in a segment depends on the price that the seller optimally charges, which depends on the set of consumers in the segment. We study which…

Motivated by agentic markets -- two-sided markets in which consumers and businesses are assisted by AI tools that facilitate consumers' search -- we study the impact of improved search technology on learning and welfare in markets. We put…

A mediator can help non-cooperative agents obtain an equilibrium that may otherwise not be possible. We study the ability of players to obtain the same equilibrium without a mediator, using only cheap talk, that is, nonbinding pre-play…