Related papers: How Many Attackers Can Selfish Defenders Catch?
Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses, and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so on.…
We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…
Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for…
Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…
This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks. The system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on…
We consider a security game in a setting consisting of two players (an attacker and a defender), each with a given budget to allocate towards attack and defense, respectively, of a set of nodes. Each node has a certain value to the attacker…
Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…
Self-play red team is an established approach to improving AI safety in which different instances of the same model play attacker and defender roles in a zero-sum game, i.e., where the attacker tries to jailbreak the defender; if self-play…
We are concerned with finding Nash Equilibria in agent-based multi-cluster games, where agents are separated into distinct clusters. While the agents inside each cluster collaborate to achieve a common goal, the clusters are considered to…
In this paper, we consider the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a multi-player game over generally connected networks. This model differs from a conventional setting in that players have partial information on the actions of their…
This paper studies the problem of defending (1D and 2D) boundaries against a large number of continuous attacks with a heterogeneous group of defenders. The defender team has perfect information of the attack events within some time (finite…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…
We consider the computation of a Nash equilibrium in attack and defense games on networks (Bloch et al. [1]). We prove that a Nash Equilibrium of the game can be computed in polynomial time with respect to the number of nodes in the…
We study in this paper privacy protection in fully distributed Nash equilibrium seeking where a player can only access its own cost function and receive information from its immediate neighbors over a directed communication network. In view…
In this paper, the problem of seeking optimal distributed resource allocation (DRA) policies on cellular networks in the presence of an unknown malicious adding-edge attacker is investigated. This problem is described as the games of games…
Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions.…
We study a target coverage problem in which a team of sensing agents, operating under limited communication, must collaboratively monitor targets that may be adaptively repositioned by an attacker. We model this interaction as a zero-sum…
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game and let attack and defense strategies evolve…
We develop an analytical Stackelberg game framework for optimal resource allocation in a sequential attacker--defender setting with a finite set of assets and probabilistic attacks. The defender commits to a mixed protection strategy, after…