Related papers: Adversarial Scheduling in Evolutionary Game Dynami…

Consider a two-player game repeated N times. Player 1 can choose between two styles (for interpretability, offensive and defensive), whereas Player 2 uses a single fixed style. Let X N\,:= \#wins -\#losses for Player 1 after N games, and…

We study adaptive learning in a typical p-player game. The payoffs of the games are randomly generated and then held fixed. The strategies of the players evolve through time as the players learn. The trajectories in the strategy space…

In a multi-agent system, transitioning from a centralized to a distributed decision-making strategy can introduce vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We study the potential for adversarial manipulation in a class of graphical…

This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the $d$-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one…

Distributed decision making in multi-agent networks has recently attracted significant research attention thanks to its wide applicability, e.g. in the management and optimization of computer networks, power systems, robotic teams, sensor…

This paper discusses the role of opportunistic punisher who may act selfishly to free-ride cooperators or not to be exploited by defectors. To consider opportunistic punisher, we make a change to the sequence of one-shot public good game;…

We establish a theoretical framework to address evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection. As the selection intensity tends to infinity, strategy competition unfolds in the deterministic way of winners taking all. We…

We present a new autoencoder-type architecture that is trainable in an unsupervised mode, sustains both generation and inference, and has the quality of conditional and unconditional samples boosted by adversarial learning. Unlike previous…

In (Istrate, Marathe, Ravi SODA 2001) we advocated the investigation of robustness of results in the theory of learning in games under adversarial scheduling models. We provide evidence that such an analysis is feasible and can lead to…

We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…

How does information regarding an adversary's intentions affect optimal system design? This paper addresses this question in the context of graphical coordination games where an adversary can indirectly influence the behavior of agents by…

Dynamics of evolutionary games strongly depend on underlying networks. We study the coevolutionary prisoner's dilemma in which players change their local networks as well as strategies (i.e., cooperate or defect). This topic has been…

We study an evolutionary version of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, played by agents placed in a small-world network. Agents are able to change their strategy, imitating that of the most successful neighbor. We observe that different…

The Prisoner's Dilemma is used as a model in processes involving reciprocity; however, its classical setup can be insufficient in settings where the symmetry of the simultaneous decision making is broken -- for example, in donor and…

We study an evolutionary version of the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where the agents are placed in a random graph. For lattices with fixed connectivity, $\alpha$, we show that for low values of $\alpha$ the final density of cooperating…

Adversarial nets have proved to be powerful in various domains including generative modeling (GANs), transfer learning, and fairness. However, successfully training adversarial nets using first-order methods remains a major challenge.…

In this paper, we study multi-agent network games subject to affine time-varying coupling constraints and a time-varying communication network. We focus on the class of games adopting proximal dynamics and study their convergence to a…

We consider the prisoner's dilemma being played repeatedly on a dynamic network, where agents may choose their actions as well as their co-players. This leads to co-evolution of network structure and strategy patterns of the players.…

This work studies Stackelberg network interdiction games -- an important class of games in which a defender first allocates (randomized) defense resources to a set of critical nodes on a graph while an adversary chooses its path to attack…

The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…