Related papers: Determinacy and Decidability of Reachability Games…

We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…

We unify standard frameworks for approachability both in full or partial monitoring by defining a new abstract game, called the "purely informative game", where the outcome at each stage is the maximal information players can obtain,…

It was shown in Flesch and Solan (2022) with a rather involved proof that all two-player stochastic games with finite state and action spaces and shift-invariant payoffs admit an $\epsilon$-equilibrium, for every $\epsilon>0$. Their proof…

Minority game is a model of heterogeneous players who think inductively. In this game, each player chooses one out of two alternatives every turn and those who end up in the minority side wins. It is instructive to extend the minority game…

This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…

We establish the existence of optimal scheduling strategies for time-bounded reachability in continuous-time Markov decision processes, and of co-optimal strategies for continuous-time Markov games. Furthermore, we show that optimal control…

This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…

We consider the reachability problem for higher-order functional programs and study the relationship between reachability games (i.e., the reachability problem for programs with angelic and demonic nondeterminism) and may-reachability…

Games on graphs provide a natural model for reactive non-terminating systems. In such games, the interaction of two players on an arena results in an infinite path that describes a run of the system. Different settings are used to model…

In two-player games on graphs, the simplest possible strategies are those that can be implemented without any memory. These are called positional strategies. In this paper, we characterize objectives recognizable by deterministic B\"uchi…

We study observation-based strategies for two-player turn-based games on graphs with omega-regular objectives. An observation-based strategy relies on imperfect information about the history of a play, namely, on the past sequence of…

In this paper, we extend the Descent framework, which enables learning and planning in the context of two-player games with perfect information, to the framework of stochastic games. We propose two ways of doing this, the first way…

We investigate a variety of cut and choose games, their relationship with (generic) large cardinals, and show that they can be used to characterize a number of properties of ideals and of partial orders: certain notions of distributivity,…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of…

We give an example of a finite-state two-player turn-based stochastic game with safety objectives for both players which has no stationary Nash equilibrium. This answers an open question of Secchi and Sudderth.

In this paper, we consider reachability games over general hybrid systems, and distinguish between two possible observation frameworks for those games: either the precise dynamics of the system is seen by the players (this is the perfect…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…