Related papers: Information Percolation with Equilibrium Search Dy…
Information sharing between individuals is crucial to improve performance in collective tasks. However, in a competitive world, individuals may be reluctant to share information with the others, and it is still unclear how the presence of…
We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…
Individual choices are either based on personal experience or on information provided by peers. The latter case, causes individuals to conform to the majority in their neighborhood. Such herding behavior may be very efficient in aggregating…
The theoretical study of social learning typically assumes that each agent's action affects only her own payoff. In this paper, I present a model in which agents' actions directly affect the payoffs of other agents. On a discrete time line,…
In this work, we consider a multi-population system where the dynamics of each agent evolve according to a system of stochastic differential equations in a general functional setup, determined by the global state of the system. Each agent…
Is there an equilibrium for distributed consensus when all agents except one collude to steer the decision value towards their preference? If an equilibrium exists, then an $n-1$ size coalition cannot do better by deviating from the…
We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities, a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field corresponds to the idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price, agents…
Different models to study the wealth distribution in an artificial society have considered a transactional dynamics as the driving force. Those models include a risk aversion factor, but also a finite probability of favoring the poorer…
We consider a platform facilitating trade between sellers and buyers with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus. Even though in many such marketplaces prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers, platforms can influence prices…
We study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents. In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when the number of traders with different private information is large enough.…
We study the dynamics of individual agents in some kinetic models of wealth exchange, particularly, the models with savings. For the model with uniform savings, agents perform simple random walks in the "wealth space". On the other hand, we…
This paper investigates the asymptotic behavior of some common opinion dynamic models in a continuum of agents. We show that as long as the interactions among the agents are symmetric, the distribution of the agents' opinion converges. We…
Data collecting agents in large networks, such as the electric power system, need to share information (measurements) for estimating the system state in a distributed manner. However, privacy concerns may limit or prevent this exchange…
We study markets where firms compete for consumer attention by subsidizing costly product inspection. These subsidies do not change product quality, but they alter the order in which consumers search by lowering inspection costs. We…
We study the power of (competitive) algorithms with predictions in a multiagent setting. To this goal, we introduce a multiagent version of the ski-rental problem. In this problem agents can collaborate by pooling resources to get a group…
Social and economic inequality is a plague of the XXI Century. It is continuously widening, as the wealth of a relatively small group increases and, therefore, the rest of the world shares a shrinking fraction of resources. This situation…
In many decision-making scenarios, individuals strategically choose what information to disclose to optimize their own outcomes. It is unclear whether such strategic information disclosure can lead to good societal outcomes. To address this…
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure…
Firms and statistical agencies must protect the privacy of the individuals whose data they collect, analyze, and publish. Increasingly, these organizations do so by using publication mechanisms that satisfy differential privacy. We consider…
This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…