Related papers: Computing voting power in easy weighted voting gam…
We study the dynamics and resulting score distribution of three-agent games where after each competition a single agent wins and scores a point. A single competition is described by a triplet of numbers $p$, $t$ and $q$ denoting the…
Researchers are increasingly focusing on intelligent games as a hot research area.The article proposes an algorithm that combines the multi-attribute management and reinforcement learning methods, and that combined their effect on…
The Shapley-Shubik index is a specialization of the Shapley value and is widely applied to evaluate the power distribution in committees drawing binary decisions. It was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval both in…
Positional games are a mathematical class of two-player games comprising Tic-tac-toe and its generalizations. We propose a novel encoding of these games into Quantified Boolean Formulas (QBFs) such that a game instance admits a winning…
Pairwise comparison matrices are frequently applied in multi-criteria decision making. A weight vector is called efficient if no other weight vector is at least as good in approximating the elements of the pairwise comparison matrix, and…
In this paper we address the problem of electing a committee among a set of $m$ candidates and on the basis of the preferences of a set of $n$ voters. We consider the approval voting method in which each voter can approve as many candidates…
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agents can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. In the classical Transferable Utility…
Election systems based on scores generally determine the winner by computing the score of each candidate and the winner is the candidate with the best score. It would be natural to expect that computing the winner of an election is at least…
We study the complexity of several combinatorial problems in the model of binary networked public goods games. In this game, players are represented by vertices in a network, and the action of each player can be either investing or not…
We study an evolutionary game of chance in which the probabilities for different outcomes (e.g., heads or tails) depend on the amount wagered on those outcomes. The game is perhaps the simplest possible probabilistic game in which…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
In the classical context, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value has been adapted for post hoc explanations of machine learning models. However, this approach does not easily translate to eXplainable Quantum ML (XQML).…
Consider an election where the set of candidates is partitioned into parties, and each party must choose exactly one candidate to nominate for the election held over all nominees. The Necessary President problem asks whether a candidate, if…
Cooperative 2-matching games are a generalization of cooperative matching games, where the value function is given by maximum-weight b-matchings, for a vertex capacity vector $b \leq 2$. We show how to separate over the core of 2-matching…
Plurality and approval voting are two well-known voting systems with different strengths and weaknesses. In this paper we consider a new voting system we call beta(k) which allows voters to select a single first-choice candidate and approve…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
Do runoff elections, using the same voting rule as the initial election but just on the winning candidates, increase or decrease the complexity of manipulation? Does allowing revoting in the runoff increase or decrease the complexity…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…