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Motivated by applications in cyber security, we develop a simple game model for describing how a learning agent's private information influences an observing agent's inference process. The model describes a situation in which one of the…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
We study a model of games that combines concurrency, imperfect information and stochastic aspects. Those are finite states games in which, at each round, the two players choose, simultaneously and independently, an action. Then a successor…
In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path, which determines the winner of the game. Such games are central in formal methods since they model the interaction between a…
In many common interactive scenarios, participants lack information about other participants, and specifically about the preferences of other participants. In this work, we model an extreme case of incomplete information, which we term…
A safe Pareto improvement (SPI) [41] is a modification of a game that leaves all players better off with certainty. SPIs are typically proven under qualitative assumptions about the way different games are played. For example, we assume…
Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social behaviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy concentrations can be derived from the players'…
Discrete Choice Modelling serves as a robust framework for modelling human choice behaviour across various disciplines. Building a choice model is a semi structured research process that involves a combination of a priori assumptions,…
This work lies in the fusion of experimental economics and data mining. It continues author's previous work on mining behaviour rules of human subjects from experimental data, where game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work.…
In timeline-based planning, domains are described as sets of independent, but interacting, components, whose behaviour over time (the set of timelines) is governed by a set of temporal constraints. A distinguishing feature of timeline-based…
We develop a minimal, timeless game-theoretic representation of the mass-geometry relation. An "Object" (mass) and "Space" (geometry) choose strategies in a static normal-form game; utilities encode stability as mutual consistency rather…
A generalized model of games is proposed, in which cooperative games and non-cooperative games are special cases. Some games that are neither cooperative nor non-cooperative can be expressed and analyzed. The model is based on relationships…
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…
Game theory provides a mathematical framework for analysing strategic situations involving at least two players. Normal-form games model situations where the players simultaneously pick their moves. In this thesis we explore the strategic…
We consider two-player games with imperfect information and the synthesis of a randomized strategy for one player that ensures the objective is satisfied almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the other…
We introduce the concept of deformed zero-determinant strategies in repeated games. We then show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game is a deformed zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…
Mechanism design has found considerable application to the construction of agent-interaction protocols. In the standard setting, the type (e.g., utility function) of an agent is not known by other agents, nor is it known by the mechanism…
Dynamic game theory is an increasingly popular tool for modeling multi-agent, e.g. human-robot, interactions. Game-theoretic models presume that each agent wishes to minimize a private cost function that depends on others' actions. These…