Related papers: Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games

We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show…

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's…

We study the problem of resilient strategies in the presence of uncertainty. Resilient strategies enable an agent to make decisions that are robust against disturbances. In particular, we are interested in those disturbances that are able…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficult to recognize someone's strategy just by observing the…

In a single-state repeated game, zero-determinant strategies can unilaterally force functions of the payoffs to take values in particular closed intervals. When the explicit use of a determinant is absent from the analysis, they are instead…

We focus on reducing communication overhead in multiplayer games, where frequently exchanging strategies between players is not feasible and players have noisy or outdated strategies of the other players. We introduce Decoupled SGDA, a…

We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…

We introduce a two-player model of reinforcement learning with memory. Past actions of an iterated game are stored in a memory and used to determine player's next action. To examine the behaviour of the model some approximate methods are…

In this thesis we introduce quantum refereed games, which are quantum interactive proof systems with two competing provers. We focus on a restriction of this model that we call "short quantum games" and we prove an upper bound and a lower…

We suggest a new algorithm for two-person zero-sum undiscounted stochastic games focusing on stationary strategies. Given a positive real $\epsilon$, let us call a stochastic game $\epsilon$-ergodic, if its values from any two initial…

We study a class of two-stage stochastic programs in which the second stage includes a set of components with uncertain capacity, and the expression for the distribution function of the uncertain capacity includes first-stage variables.…

This paper presents a learning dynamic with almost sure convergence guarantee for any stochastic game with turn-based controllers (on state transitions) as long as stage-payoffs induce a zero-sum or identical-interest game. Stage-payoffs…

We consider perfect-information reachability stochastic games for 2 players on infinite graphs. We identify a subclass of such games, and prove two interesting properties of it: first, Player Max always has optimal strategies in games from…

First cycle games (FCG) are played on a finite graph by two players who push a token along the edges until a vertex is repeated, and a simple cycle is formed. The winner is determined by some fixed property Y of the sequence of labels of…

Consider concurrent, infinite duration, two-player win/lose games played on graphs. If the winning condition satisfies some simple requirement, the existence of Player 1 winning (finite-memory) strategies is equivalent to the existence of…

Significant progress has been recently achieved in developing efficient solutions for simple stochastic games (SSGs), focusing on reachability objectives. While reductions from stochastic parity games (SPGs) to SSGs have been presented in…

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the follower) plays a best response to this strategy (ties are broken…

We motivate and propose a new model for non-cooperative Markov game which considers the interactions of risk-aware players. This model characterizes the time-consistent dynamic "risk" from both stochastic state transitions (inherent to the…

In this paper, we study reflected backward stochastic difference equations (RBSDEs for short) with finitely many states in discrete time. The general existence and uniqueness result, as well as comparison theorems for the solutions, are…

Priced timed games are optimal-cost reachability games played between two players---the controller and the environment---by moving a token along the edges of infinite graphs of configurations of priced timed automata. The goal of the…