Related papers: On the Complexity of Core, Kernel, and Bargaining …
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
In cooperative games, the core is the most popular solution concept, and its properties are well known. In the classical setting of cooperative games, it is generally assumed that all coalitions can form, i.e., they are all feasible. In…
The core is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory, defined as the set of feasible allocations or payments such that no subset of agents has incentive to break away and form their own subgroup or coalition. However, it has…
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among self-interested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging the participants in a set of $j$ given losing coalitions into a set of $j$ winning coalitions.…
Matching games naturally generalize assignment games, a well-known class of cooperative games. Interest in matching games has grown recently due to some breakthrough results and new applications. This state-of-the-art survey provides an…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
Representation languages for coalitional games are a key research area in algorithmic game theory. There is an inherent tradeoff between how general a language is, allowing it to capture more elaborate games, and how hard it is…
The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely…
The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually depends on values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to various reasons. We introduce a method to…
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the…
Coalition formation is a key topic in multi-agent systems. Coalitions enable agents to achieve goals that they may not have been able to achieve on their own. Previous work has shown problems in coalitional games to be computationally hard.…
The present study explores a problem that can be resolved by employing the notion of a partially defined cooperative game, yet cannot by using a restricted game. The following situation is considered: First, it is assumed that the worth of…
The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation lies in the core of the game if, for each sub-coalition, the…
We are concerned with the stability of a coalitional game, i.e., a transferable-utility (TU) cooperative game. First, the concept of core can be weakened so that the blocking of changes is limited to only those with multilateral backings.…
In the framework of transferable utility coalitional games, a scoring (characteristic) function determines the value of any subset/coalition of agents. Agents decide on both which coalitions to form and the allocations of the values of the…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…