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Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits that implement reconfigurable hardware. They are used in modern systems, creating specialized, highly-optimized integrated circuits without the need to design and manufacture…
Exponential error bounds achievable by universal coding and decoding are derived for frame-asynchronous discrete memoryless %asynchronous multiple access channels with two senders, via the method of subtypes, a refinement of the method of…
This paper investigates an emerging cache side channel attack defense approach involving the use of hardware performance counters (HPCs). These counters monitor microarchitectural events and analyze statistical deviations to differentiate…
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…
A method for the implementation of a universal set of fault-tolerant logical gates is presented using homological product codes. In particular, it is shown that one can fault-tolerantly map between different encoded representations of a…
Timing side channels have been used to extract cryptographic keys and sensitive documents, even from trusted enclaves. In this paper, we focus on cache side channels created by access to shared code or data in the memory hierarchy. This…
In a zero-trust fabless paradigm, designers are increasingly concerned about hardware-based attacks on the semiconductor supply chain. Logic locking is a design-for-trust method that adds extra key-controlled gates in the circuits to…
The impeccable design of sensitive and cryptographic circuits (CC) against fault injection attacks is essential for modern data storage, communication, and computation systems that are susceptible to fault injection attacks. The robustness…
The implementation of fault-tolerant quantum gates on encoded logic qubits is considered. It is shown that transversal implementation of logic gates based on simple geometric control ideas is problematic for realistic physical systems…
Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences.…
Machine learning has become mainstream across industries. Numerous examples proved the validity of it for security applications. In this work, we investigate how to reverse engineer a neural network by using only power side-channel…
The new vision presented is aimed to overcome the logic overhead issues that previous works exhibit when applying GALS techniques to programmable logic devices. The proposed new view relies in a 2-phase, bundled data parity based protocol…
Discovering new vulnerabilities and implementing security and privacy measures are important to protect systems and data against physical attacks. One such vulnerability is impedance, an inherent property of a device that can be exploited…
We propose a method, based on program analysis and transformation, for eliminating timing side channels in software code that implements security-critical applications. Our method takes as input the original program together with a list of…
Integrated circuit (IC) camouflaging is a promising technique to protect the design of a chip from reverse engineering. However, recent work has shown that even camouflaged ICs can be reverse engineered from the observed input/output…
We systematize software side-channel attacks with a focus on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in the cryptographic implementations. Particularly, we survey past research literature to categorize vulnerable implementations, and identify…
The constant-time discipline is a software-based countermeasure used for protecting high assurance cryptographic implementations against timing side-channel attacks. Constant-time is effective (it protects against many known attacks),…
Cache side channel attacks are a sophisticated and persistent threat that exploit vulnerabilities in modern processors to extract sensitive information. These attacks leverage weaknesses in shared computational resources, particularly the…
We demonstrate an attack on a clock synchronization protocol that attempts to detect tampering of the synchronization channel using polarization-entangled photon pairs. The protocol relies on a symmetrical channel, where propagation delays…
A key distinguishing feature of single flux quantum (SFQ) circuits is that each logic gate is clocked. This feature forces the introduction of path-balancing flip-flops to ensure proper synchronization of inputs at each gate. This paper…