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To defeat side-channel attacks, many recent countermeasures work by enforcing random run-time variability to the target computing platform in terms of clock jitters, frequency and voltage scaling, and phase shift, also combining the…
This article presents an asynchronous FPGA architecture for implementing cryptographic algorithms secured against physical cryptanalysis. We discuss the suitability of asynchronous reconfigurable architectures for such applications before…
Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…
We propose FPGA-Patch, the first-of-its-kind defense that leverages automated program repair concepts to thwart power side-channel attacks on cloud FPGAs. FPGA-Patch generates isofunctional variants of the target hardware by injecting…
Evolving attacks on the vulnerabilities of the computing systems demand novel defense strategies to keep pace with newer attacks. This report discusses previous works on side-channel attacks (SCAs) and defenses for cache-targeted and…
In recent years a new class of side-channel attacks has emerged. Instead of targeting device emissions during dynamic computation, adversaries now frequently exploit the leakage or response behaviour of integrated circuits in a static…
Side-channel and fault injection attacks reveal secret information by monitoring or manipulating the physical effects of computations involving secret variables. Circuit-level countermeasures help to deter these attacks, and traditionally…
Attacks based on side-channel analysis (SCA) pose a severe security threat to modern computing platforms, further exacerbated on IoT devices by their pervasiveness and handling of private and critical data. Designing SCA-resistant computing…
Side-channel attacks pose significant challenges to the security of embedded systems, often allowing attackers to circumvent encryption algorithms in minutes compared to the trillions of years required for brute-force attacks. To mitigate…
Asynchronous circuits have several advantages for security applications, in particular their good resistance to attacks. In this paper, we report on experiments with modeling, at various abstraction levels, a patented asynchronous circuit…
Static side-channel analysis attacks, which rely on a stopped clock to extract sensitive information, pose a growing threat to embedded systems' security. To protect against such attacks, several proposed defenses aim to detect unexpected…
Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
This paper presents a novel FPGA architecture for implementing various styles of asynchronous logic. The main objective is to break the dependency between the FPGA architecture dedicated to asynchronous logic and the logic style. The…
Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…
Logic locking is used to protect integrated circuits (ICs) from piracy and counterfeiting. An encrypted IC implements the correct function only when the right key is input. Many existing logic-locking methods are subject to the powerful…
This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection during…
Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…