Related papers: Counterexamples in Cake-Cutting
In this short note we present a family of counterexamples to the King's conjecture.
The proof of Theorem 11 of the paper M. Scheepers, Remarks on countable tightness, Topology and its Applications 161 (2014), 407 - 432 relies on Lemma 10 of that paper. The offered proof of Lemma 10 had shortcomings, and I was recently…
We narrow the gap between the family of graphs that do and the family of graphs that do not satisfy the fat minor conjecture by obtaining much simpler counterexamples than were previously known, including $K_t, t \geq 6$ and $K_{s,t}, s,t…
The cake-cutting problem involves dividing a heterogeneous, divisible resource fairly between $n$ agents. Br\^{a}nzei et al. [6] introduced {\em generalised cut and choose} (GCC) protocols, a formal model for representing cake-cutting…
In model checking, when a given model fails to satisfy the desired specification, a typical model checker provides a counterexample that illustrates how the violation occurs. In general, there exist many diverse counterexamples that exhibit…
The aim of this short note is to give counterexamples to two results by D. Y. Gao [5, Th. 16], [4, Th. 2] and to improve a related result by S.-C. Fang, D. Y. Gao, R.-L. Sheu and S.-Y. Wu [1, Th. 3].
We consider the classic problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous good ("cake") among several agents with different valuations. Classic cake-cutting procedures either allocate each agent a collection of disconnected pieces, or assume that…
We study the disproportionate version of the classical cake-cutting problem: how efficiently can we divide a cake, here $[0,1]$, among $n$ agents with different demands $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$ summing to $1$? When all the…
In this paper we propose counterexamples to the Geometrization Conjecture and the Elliptization Conjecture.
The paper considers fair allocation of resources that are already allocated in an unfair way. This setting requires a careful balance between the fairness considerations and the rights of the present owners. The paper presents re-division…
It is known that the linking form on the 2-cover of slice knots has a metabolizer. We show that several weaker conditions, or some other conditions related to sliceness, do not imply the existence of a metabolizer. We then show how the…
The article provides a counterexample to a conjecture by Blocki-Zwonek.
Envy-free cake-cutting protocols procedurally divide an infinitely divisible good among a set of agents so that no agent prefers another's allocation to their own. These protocols are highly complex and difficult to prove correct. Recently,…
The paper presents a counterexample to the Hodge conjecture.
We prove an analytic KAM-Theorem, which is used in [1], where the differential part of KAM-theory is discussed. Related theorems on analytic KAM-theory exist in the literature (e. g., among many others, [7], [8], [13]). The aim of the…
We consider the classical cake-cutting problem where we wish to fairly divide a heterogeneous resource, often modeled as a cake, among interested agents. Work on the subject typically assumes that the cake is represented by an interval. In…
In contrast to the classical cake-cutting problem (how to fairly divide a desirable object), "chore division" is the problem of how to divide an undesirable object. We develop the first explicit algorithm for envy-free chore division among…
The classic cake cutting problem concerns the fair allocation of a heterogeneous resource among interested agents. In this paper, we study a public goods variant of the problem, where instead of competing with one another for the cake, the…
In this short note we present a simple counterexample to a nonlinear version of the Krein-Rutman theorem reported in [Nonlinear Anal. 11 (2007), 3084-3090]. Correct versions of this theorem, and related results for superadditive maps are…
We address the problem of fair division, or cake cutting, with the goal of finding truthful mechanisms. In the case of a general measure space ("cake") and non-atomic, additive individual preference measures - or utilities - we show that…