Related papers: Correlated Anarchy in Overlapping Wireless Network…
This paper develops a game-theoretic framework for the design and analysis of a new class of incentive schemes called intervention schemes. We formulate intervention games, propose a solution concept of intervention equilibrium, and prove…
In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For…
The problem of noncooperative resource allocation in a multipoint-to-multipoint cellular network is considered in this paper. The considered scenario is general enough to represent several key instances of modern wireless networks such as a…
We introduce a framework for studying the effect of cooperation on the quality of outcomes in utility games. Our framework is a coalitional analog of the smoothness framework of non-cooperative games. Coalitional smoothness implies bounds…
Multi-agent networked linear dynamic systems have attracted attention of researchers in power systems, intelligent transportation, and industrial automation. The agents might cooperatively optimize a global performance objective, resulting…
We consider the problem of two wireless networks operating on the same (presumably unlicensed) frequency band. Pairs within a given network cooperate to schedule transmissions, but between networks there is competition for spectrum. To make…
This work tackles the problem of energy-efficient distributed power control in wireless networks with a large number of transmitters. The problem is modeled by a dynamic game. Each transmitter-receiver communication is characterized by a…
The robustness of multiagent systems can be affected by mistakes or behavioral biases (e.g., risk-aversion, altruism, toll-sensitivity), with some agents playing the "wrong game." This can change the set of equilibria, and may in turn harm…
In this paper, the application of wireless information and power transfer to cooperative networks is investigated, where the relays in the network are randomly located and based on the decode-forward strategy. For the scenario with one…
In communication systems where users share common resources, users' selfish behavior usually results in suboptimal resource utilization. There have been extensive works that model communication systems with selfish users as one-shot games…
In multi-hop ad hoc networks, selfish nodes may unduly acquire high quality of service (QoS) by assigning higher priority to source packets and lower priority to transit packets. Such traffic remapping attacks (TRAs) are cheap to launch,…
Under certain assumptions in terms of information and models, equilibria correspond to possible stable outcomes in conflicting or cooperative scenarios where rational entities interact. For wireless engineers, it is of paramount importance…
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a well-established game-theoretic concept to shed light on coordination issues arising in open distributed systems. Leaving agents to selfishly optimize comes with the risk of ending up in sub-optimal states…
This paper considers a conjecture-based distributed learning approach that enables autonomous nodes to independently optimize their transmission probabilities in random access networks. We model the interaction among multiple…
Modern random access mechanisms combine packet repetitions with multi-user detection mechanisms at the receiver to maximize the throughput and reliability in massive Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. However, optimizing the access policy,…
We consider the distributed uplink resource allocation problem in a multi-carrier wireless network with multiple access points (APs). Each mobile user can optimize its own transmission rate by selecting a suitable AP and by controlling its…
Many real-world networks, like the Internet, are not the result of central design but instead the outcome of the interaction of local agents who are selfishly optimizing for their individual utility. The famous Network Creation Game…
The price of anarchy, originally introduced to quantify the inefficiency of selfish behavior in routing games, is extended to mean field games. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio of a worst case social cost computed for a mean…
There have been great efforts in studying the cascading behavior in social networks such as the innovation diffusion, etc. Game theoretically, in a social network where individuals choose from two strategies: A (the innovation) and B (the…
The reliability and security of a user in an interconnected system depends on all users' collective effort in security. Consequently, investments in security technologies by strategic users is typically modeled as a public good problem,…