Related papers: Evolution of Cooperation and Coordination in a Dyn…

This paper examines the integration of computational complexity into game theoretic models. The example focused on is the Prisoner's Dilemma, repeated for a finite length of time. We show that a minimal bound on the players' computational…

The real world is awash with multi-agent problems that require collective action by self-interested agents, from the routing of packets across a computer network to the management of irrigation systems. Such systems have local incentives…

Here we present an agent-based model where agents interact with other agents by playing a hybrid of dictator and ultimatum games in a co-evolving social network. The basic assumption about the behaviour of the agents in both games is that…

Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity…

In this work, we study the social learning problem, in which agents of a networked system collaborate to detect the state of the nature based on their private signals. A novel distributed graphical evolutionary game theoretic learning…

Community organization permeates both social and biological complex systems. To study its interplay with behavior emergence, we model mobile structured populations with multiplayer interactions. We derive general analytical methods for…

The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…

During the last few years, much research has been devoted to strategic interactions on complex networks. In this context, the Prisoner's Dilemma has become a paradigmatic model, and it has been established that imitative evolutionary…

Cooperation and defection are social traits whose evolutionary origin is still unresolved. Recent behavioral experiments with humans suggested that strategy changes are driven mainly by the individuals' expectations and not by imitation.…

The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to…

We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study…

Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network…

Understanding cooperation in social dilemmas requires models that capture the complexity of real-world interactions. While network frameworks have provided valuable insights to model the evolution of cooperation, they are unable to encode…

Cooperation is commonly found in ecological and social systems even when it apparently seems that individuals can benefit from selfish behavior. We investigate how cooperation emerges with the spatial prisoner's dilemma played in a class of…

We outline a model to study the evolution of cooperation in a population of agents playing the prisoner's dilemma in signed networks. We highlight that if only dyadic interactions are taken into account, cooperation never evolves. However,…

How cooperation evolves and particularly maintains at a large scale remains an open problem for improving humanity across domains ranging from climate change to pandemic response. To shed light on how behavioral norms can resolve the social…

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain…

We introduce a coevolutionary framework in which punishment intensity dynamically adapts to the fraction of cooperators in the population. Unlike static models, adaptive punishment reshapes the effective payoff landscape, driving…

We study a model for switching strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game on adaptive networks of player pairings that coevolve as players attempt to maximize their return. We use a node-based strategy model wherein each player follows one…